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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
AND APPEALS
By WILLIAM H. ERICKSON*
The log jam of cases at issue in the Supreme Court was broken
by full use of the rights granted to the Supreme Court to hear and
determine cases in department under article VI, section 5, of the
Colorado Constitution. Three hundred sixty-nine written opinions
issued out of the Supreme Court in 1960, sixty-seven of which were
written by outside county or district judges who sat with the court
and wrote the opinions in accordance with the court's directions in
department. In hearing cases in department, three justices of the
Supreme Court always participated and oral argument was required
in all cases. Moreover, the right to hear a case in department is
limited to those cases where no constitutional right is involved un-
der either the Colorado Constitution or the Constitution of the
United States. Under the mandate of article VI, section 5 of the
Colorado Constitution, no decision could be a judgment of the Su-
preme Court unless concurred in by at least three judges of the
Supreme Court, and in many cases there was not unanimity of opin-
ion among the three justices, and an en banc session of the court
was required to voice the court's opinion.
In Horton v. Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank' the judgment was
affirmed by operation of law when the chief justice did not partici-
pate and three judges voted for affirmance and three for reversal
after the case was first heard in department. See Scott v. Shook2
on the issue of the right to additional oral argument after a hearing
in department.
A number of decisions construed the Rules of Civil Procedure
and those decisions are reviewed in this article in the numerical or-
der of the Rules. The author has endeavored to include in this arti-
cle all decisions of the court which set forth, alter, or clarify the
Rules of Civil Procedure.
RULE 12
A. Motion to Dismiss
The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether a
complaint stated a claim upon which relief could be granted in a
number of cases.
The complaint for an accounting in McKinney v. Christmas:
was dismissed by the trial court as being insufficient, but was up-
held by the Supreme Court. The court held that in assessing a mo-
tion to dismiss the facts alleged are admitted and the sole question
is whether the complaint contains allegations affording sufficient
notice of the claim to advise the defendant of the relief sought.
In a tort action, Spomer v. City of Grand Junction,4 a claim was
made that the city, in the operation of a cemetery, had wrongfully
removed a body from a burial lot, and the trial court sustained a
*Member of the Denver and Colorado Bar Associat'ons and of the Denver firm of Hindry, Erickson
and Meyer.
1 355 P.2d 1089 (Colo. 1960).
280 Colo. 40, 249 Pac. 259 (1926). See also 47 A.L.R. 1108 (1927); Colo. R. Civ. P. 117.
3 353 P.2d 373 (Colo. 1960).
4 355 P.2d 960 (Colo. 1960).
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motion to dismiss at the close of the plaintiff's case. In reversing
the trial court, the court said:
Under the Rules of Civil Procedure the main purpose
of the complaint is to furnish notice to an adversary of the
transaction or occurrence complained of. If a party states
any claim and proves it by a preponderance of evidence, he
is entitled to relief. As was said in Bridges v. Ingram, 122
Colo. 501, 223 P. (2d) 1051, 1054:
'* * * If sufficient notice concerning the transaction in-
volved is afforded the adverse party, the theory of the
pleader is not important. If, under the facts, the substan-
tive law provided relief upon any theory, the cause should
proceed to judgment. * * *'
Rulings of this court under former practice and proce-
dure that pleadings are construed most strongly against the
pleader are not in harmony with present day procedure in
civil actions. The rule now is that pleadings are to be con-
strued in favor of the pleader. It necessarily follows that
issues joined upon matters which are immaterial to a claim
are surplusage and need not be proved. So in the case be-
fore us if any of the allegations of the amended complaint
gave notice to the defendants of a claim for relief and there
was some competent evidence produced at the trial upon
which relief could be granted, a dismissal of the action was
not in order.;
Cline v. Whitten6 came before the court after judgment was en-
tered on a motion to dismiss. The plaintiff had sought to have its
rights determined and to obtain protection against interference
with the storage of water coming from springs. The defendant's
motion set forth that the complaint failed to state a claim against
the defendant upon which relief could be granted, and that the re-
lief could only be obtained in a proceeding for the adjudication of
the rights of all parties in the water district in which the right was
claimed.
In reversing the trial court, the court said that the plaintiff's
complaint stated facts which if proven entitled plaintiff to the in-
junctive relief sought.
Malicious prosecution was the allegation of the plaintiff in
Lowen v. Hilton7 The plaintiff contended that a hold and treat or-
der entered out of the county court on the basis of a letter from
Doctor Hilton which was obtained through the plaintiff's brother.
Subsequently, the county court found that the plaintiff was not in-
sane, and the complaint was filed shortly thereafter. The defend-
ants all filed motions to dismiss, and the motions were sustained.
The defendants contended that the one-year statute of limitations
for false imprisonment barred the action." The two-year statute of
limitations protecting those in the healing arts was also looked to
as a bar by Doctor Hilton." Another statute pleaded as an affirma-
tive defense provides in part: "Such order of the court shall be a
complete protection for the confinement, examination, diagnosis,
5 Id. at 962-63.
6 355 P.2d 396 (Colo. 1960).
7 351 P.2d 881 (Cola. 1960).
t Colo. Rev. Stat. 87-1-2 (1953).
9 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 87-1-6 (1953).
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observation and treatment of such patient as against all persons."'10
The Supreme Court held that the affirmative defenses were not
well taken. The statute of limitations was held to be inapplicable,
and the court said:
For purposes of the motion to dismiss, all facts alleged
in the complaint must be assumed to be true. We are satis-
fied that it was not the intention of the legislature to leave
a person without a remedy of any kind who admittedly has
been subjected to the grievous wrongs here alleged to have
been committed by the defendants.
The purpose of the statute relied on for dismissal is to
protect those persons who, following the entry of the 'hold
and treat' order, have the responsibility pursuant to said
order 'for the confinement, examination, diagnosis, obser-
vation and treatment of such patient.'
A person who admittedly has been maliciously wronged
by persons who conspire to prosecute him as an insane per-
son without probable cause, cannot be deprived of a judi-
cial remedy for the wrong. Had the legislature intended
any such result, which we think it did not, the statute
would be of doubtful validity when subjected to the test
of Article II Section 6 of the Constitution of Colorado .... 11
In Knowlton v. Cervi,'2 the court held that a complaint in a li-
bel suit must state a claim upon which relief may be granted and
10 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 71-1-3 (3) (1953).
11 Lowen v. Hilton, supra note 7 at 883.
12 350 P.
2
d 1C66 (Colo. 1960).
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that a trial court may grant a motion to dismiss in a libel action as
well as in other suits, and affirmed the trial court's granting of the
motion to dismiss.
In Flank Oil Co. v. Tennessee Gas Transmission,13 a case brought
under the Colorado Unfair Practices Act,1" the plaintiff sought a
temporary and permanent injunction. The defendants moved to
dismiss, questioning the constitutionality of the Act, and the indef-
inite language of the statute. The motions to dismiss were sustained,
and the plaintiffs elected to stand upon the complaint as filed and
prayed that a final judgment of dismissal be entered. In reversing
the trial court, the Supreme Court held that the issue of the consti-
tutionality of the statute could be determined on a motion to dis-
miss, but upheld the statute and pointed out that the questions
raised were not constitutional in nature and that the problems urged
as grounds for upholding the judgment of dismissal were prema-
ture and must await the trial of the case.
In examining the powers of district judges sitting separately
in the same county, the Supreme Court in Denver Electric & Neon
Serv. Corp. v. Phipps, Inc.1 5 upheld the trial judge's dismissal of
various claims set out in the plaintiff's complaint which had been
previously held to be sufficient by a different trial judge in the
same county and said that the order denying the motion to dismiss
could be modified or changed under the limitations of Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 37-4-18 (1953).
In McPherson v. McPherson1" the court found that a claimant
against an estate had been denied his day in court by summary dis-
missal of his claim after the court had determined that the hearing
on the claim should be in accordance with the Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. A motion to strike had been treated by the trial court as a
motion to dismiss and was argued as a defense of laches and the
statute of limitations. The court held that the statute of limitations
is not grounds for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted and pointed out that the statute of
limitations and laches must be affirmatively pleaded in an answer
under Rule 8(c) and could have only been properly determined
after a full hearing on the merits.
B. Judgment on the Pleadings
Flavell v. Dep't of Welfare T reversed an order granting judg-
ment on the pleadings. The action was one to recover the unpaid
balance on a promissory note and the execution of the note was ad-
mitted. Affirmative defenses were pleaded before the trial court
by way of answer, counterclaim, and reply. The court found that
the allegations in the pleadings raised issues of both fact and law
which must be presumed to be true for the purpose of considering
a motion for judgment on the pleadings and remanded the case
for trial on the merits.
C. Bill of Particulars
In affirming the judgment of the trial court in Sheldon v.
Schmidt,' the court cast aside the argument that error had been
13 349 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1960).
14 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 55-2-1 (1955).
15 354 P.2d 618 (Colo. 1960).
16358 P.2d 478 (Colo. 1960).
17 355 P.2d 941 (Colo. 1960).





committed by the denial of a bill of particulars in a debt action and
said:
The granting or denying of a motion to make a plead-
ing more definite and certain lies within the sound dis-
cretion of the trial court and its ruling on such a motion
will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing of
an abuse of discretion and prejudice to the party affected.
The defendant here made no effort to avail himself of
the many procedural steps open to him under the rules
whereby he could have obtained the information he claimed
he needed in order to answer the complaint. When the
amended complaint was filed, he promptly answered and
again did nothing to obtain more definite information from
the plaintiff. The evidence at the trial shows that many
of the facts sought in his motion were known to the de-
fendant before the suit was filed.
We are persuaded that no prejudice resulted to de-
fendant by refusal of the court to grant his motion to make
more definite and certain; nor did the court abuse its dis-
cretion in denying the motion. 19
RULE 15
The right to amendment was declared to be sacrosanct in Ren-
ner v. Chilton.20 Claims had been made in the trial court which did
not withstand a motion to dismiss, and the trial judge refused to
allow the plaintiff to amend his complaint on his oral motion and
stated that the entire complaint seemed to be based on judicial or
semi-judicial proceedings which were privileged. The court af-
firmed the trial court's finding of privilege, but held that under
Rule 15 (a) a party is entitled to one amendment as a matter of
right when a responsive pleading has not been filed.
RULE 38
In an action to recover an attorney's fee, Jaynes v. Marrow
21
brough into play Rules 38 and 39. When the original complaint and
answer were filed neither party made demand for a jury trial. Near-
ly a year after the case was at issue and shortly before trial the de-
fendant filed a demand for a jury trial, and a jury trial was ordered
over the objection of the plaintiff. The jury returned a verdict for
the defendant, and on writ of error it was argued that the defendant
had waived his right to a jury trial as a matter of law by his belated
request. In analyzing Rule 38 the court pointed out that a litigant
could secure a jury trial as a matter of right by complying with the
requirements of the rule, but held that the trial court, in its discre-
tion, under Rule 39, notwithstanding the failure of a party to de-
mand a jury trial, could order a trial by a jury on any or all issues.
The court refused to follow the federal rule, which imposes a severe
limitation on belated jury requests and limits the discretion of the
trial judge, and said: "Trial courts, either with a belated motion
before them, with or without reasons stated therein, or without any
motion at all, may order a jury trial, because it is within their dis-
cretion so to do."
22
19 Id. at 289-90.
20 351 P.2d 277.(Colo. 1960).
21 355 P.2d 529 cc:,;. .
22 Id. t AM
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A declaratory judgment action furnished the background for
Baumgartner v. Schey2 3 and an interpretation of Rule 38 in connec-
tion with Rule 57. The question before the court in the declaratory
judgment action was whether the actions and conduct of the parties
had extended a written lease for farm land for an additional year.
The trial court granted trial to a jury but reserved its judgment on
the question of whether the defendants were entitled to a jury trial
in view of a claim made by the plaintiff for an accounting in con-
nection with the declaratory relief sought. The jury returned a
verdict for the defendants which the trial court set aside. In re-
versing the trial court, the court held that the right to a jury trial
is to be determined by whether the right existed prior to the pas-
sage of the Declaratory Judgment Act in the particular type of ac-
tion before the court, and held that all of the pleadings, as well as
all issues and evidence, must be examined to determine whether
the issues were legal or equitable, and that joinder of legal and
equitable remedies would not deprive a party of the right to jury
trial on legal issues.
It was urged in McGregor v. Porter24 that a request for a jury
trial, made at the pretrial conference, which was not ruled upon,
constituted grounds for reversal after trial was completed to the
court, without objection. The court found that trial to a jury had
been waived.
23 3 3 P.2d 375 (Colo. 1960).
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Droghei v. Meehan25 involved the interpretation of Rule 42 after
two damage actions had been consolidated for trial. The facts were
the same in both actions, the witnesses were identical, and they
were competent to testify in each suit. The court found that there
was no abuse of discretion by the trial court consolidating the two
actions for trial.
RULE 43 (b)
The question before the court in Van Hise v. Trino2 6 was wheth-
er the trial court committed prejudicial error in denying counsel
for the defendant the right to cross-examine the defendant upon
the subject matter of the examination in chief after the defendant
was called as an adverse witness for cross-examination under Rule
43(b). The court acknowledged the defendant's contention that
Rule 43 (b) grants the right of cross-examination at the time a par-
ty is called as an adverse witness for cross-examination but found
no prejudice by reason of the fact that the defendant took the stand
on her own behalf and presented her testimony fully to the court.
RULE 44
Rule 44(a) was the key issue in Superior Distrib. Corp. v. Har-
grove27 when the plaintiff sought to enforce an Oklahoma judgment.
The record before the trial court consisted of certified copies of var-
ious instruments from the court of common pleas of Oklahoma and
formed the basis of the trial court's judgment. In reversing the low-
er court and remanding the case for new trial, the court said:
Were these certified copies such as to comply with
R.C.P. 44(a)?
The question is answered in the negative.
The rule provides:
'An official record or an entry therein, when admissi-
ble for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official pub-
lication thereof, or by a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody of the record or his deputy, and accom-
panied with a certificate that such officer has the custody.
If the office in which the record is kept is within the Unit-
ed States or within a territory or possession subject to the
dominion of the United States, the certificate may be made
by a judge of a court of record of the district or political
subdivision in which the record is kept, authenticated by
the seal of the court, or may be made by any public officer
having a seal of office and having official duties in the dis-
trict or political subdivision in which the record is kept,
authenticated by the seal of his office. * * *.I
There is a difference between a certified copy of a rec-
ord and one made according to the rule. The rule is plain
and is in full force and effect. It was not followed.
The court erred in the first instance in admitting these
documents into evidence. Had it ruled properly thereon,
plaintiffs might have been able to prove the judgment
through other methods as provided in R.C.P. 44 (c):
25 353 P.2d 98 (Colo. 1960).
26 352 P.2d 284 (Colo. 1960).
27 355 P.2d 312 (Colo. 1960).
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'This rule does not prevent the proof of official records
or of entry or lack of entry therein by any method author-
ized by any applicable statute or by the rules of evidence
at common law.'
28
The procedure to be followed in enforcing foreign judgments
was made crystal clear by the court in a series of decisions.
In Ginsberg v. Gifford29 the plaintiff was the assignee of a
California superior court judgment. The record before the trial
court included a verified complaint, a summons, an affidavit of
service, an affidavit re military service, a written application for
entry of the default, an entry of default, and a certificate of the
clerk declaring that the judgment had been entered and that no ap-
peal had been taken or any order entered modifying or vacating
the judgment. The plaintiff also offered by way of evidence the
California Interest Statute and the California Constitution showing
jurisdiction in the superior court. The trial court held that the
complaint was insufficient and contained no averment that the for-
eign judgment was valid, final, and enforceable under the laws of
the State of California and that the element of present enforcea-
bility was totally lacking in the complaint. It dismissed the com-
plaint pursuant to the defendant's motion. The complaint provided
that a judgment had been entered and stated the amount due and
owing. The Supreme Court held that a prima facie case was shown
and that the trial court had erred in dismissing the complaint.
In Superior Distrib. Corp. v. Zarelli30 the sole issue was whether
the trial court erred in failing to grant the defendant's motion to
dismiss after the plaintiff had rested his case and the defendant
elected to stand on its motion. The suit was to recover a judgment
which was entered in favor of the plaintiff in the superior court of
Washington. The defendant contended that the complaint was de-
fective because it failed to allege that the Washington judgment
was a valid and final judgment capable of being enforced in that
state and relied on Gobin v. Citizens' State Bank.31 The defendant's
contentions, however, were cast aside when the court ruled:
These allegations in substance allege that the judg-
ment was a valid and final adjudication remaining in full
force in the state of its rendition and capable of being there
enforced by final process. Under our liberalized rules of
civil procedure it is the substance of the complaint rather
than the form that is paramount. We thus hold plaintiff
in error's contention that the failure to include the allega-
tion in the exact words stated in the Gobin case constitutes
reversible error to be without merit .... ".2
In Blackmon v. Klein33 the court again had occasion to examine
the procedure for the enforcement of a foreign judgment. A Wyo-
ming judgment was the subject of the suit and the defense inter-
posed in the trial court was the statute of limitations. In-affirming
the lower court, Colo. Rev. Stat. §87-1-22 and 87-1-30 were inter-
preted and the court found that the statute of limitations did not
2 Id. at 313.
29 355 P.2d 657 (Colo. 1960).
30 352 P.2d 967 (Colo. 1960).
31 92 Colo. 350, 20 P.2d 1007 (1933).
32 Superior Distributing Corp. v. Zarelli, 352 P.2d 967, 968 (Colo. 1960).
3 357 P.2d 91 (Colo. 1960).
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bar the action under the statutes cited by reason of the fact that the
defendant had absented himself from the State of Colorado and had
tolled the statute of limitations.
However, in Superior Distrib. Corp. v. McCror 34 the court re-
versed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff on a Florida judgment,
finding that the judgment was conditional by nature and stated:
We consider the circumstances allegedly furnishing a
ground for reversible error. At the conclusion of McCrory's
evidence Superior moved for dismissal, submitting that the
Florida judgment was 'totally interlocutory'; that until the
conditions imposed upon McCrory had 'been done, this
(was) not in fact a final judgment and (McCrory was)
not entitled to recover because the Court specifically states
that he shall be entitled to a final judgment upon doing so.'
It is claimed that denial of this motion was error.
The resolution of this point makes unnecessary the
consideration of other questions presented. Decided cases
point to an impediment in the maintenance of the suit on
the Florida judgment, i.e., a contingent, inconclusive ad-
judication, interlocutory in nature.
While the judgment of one state is entitled to receive
the same faith and credit given it in the state where en-
tered, yet it is necessary 'that, in order to maintain an ac-
tion in one state upon a money judgment recovered in an-
other state, such judgment must be a final adjudication, in
full force in the state where rendered and capable of being
enforced by final process, and ordinarily it should create
a definite and absolute indebtedness against the judgment
debtor.'...35
RULE 54 (b)
In construing Rule 54 (b) and the final judgment requirements
of Rule 111 (a) the Supreme Court found that there was no final
judgment and dismissed a writ of error in Fidelity & Deposit v.
May.36 The case involved multiple claims and multiple defendants.
One defendant obtained a summary judgment in the trial court and
34 356 P.2d 961 (Colo. 1960).
35 Id. at 962.






the plaintiff caused a writ of error to issue. The plaintiff contended
in the Supreme Court that there was no final judgment and filed
a motion which was sustained. The court said in interpreting Rule
54(b):
Construction of this rule and its application to the en-
try of a summary judgment in favor of less than all the par-
ties in a multiple claim situation was had in the case of
Broadway Roofing and Supply, Inc. v. District Court, 140
Colo. [154], 342 P. (2d) 1022. Our disposition of that case
furnishes a guide and precedent for the instant case. In
that case we held that, in order to effect a final judgment or
final disposition of the case, thus rendering it reviewable
by this court, the trial court should have (1) expressly de-
termined that there was no just reason for delay, and (2)
expressly directed the entry of a judgment.
There is finality in what the trial court did in the in-
stant case, but finality under the rule contemplates more
than the rendition of a judgment. A rule has been estab-
lished which, in definitive language, directs what must be
done where multiple claims are involved and less than all
of them decided.
3 7
The publicized knitting machine cases found their way to the
court in Berry v. West Knit Originals, Inc.," when eighty-one plain-
tiffs claimed they were induced to purchase knitting machines by
fraudulent representations. All the defendants did not appear be-
fore the Supreme Court. The case was viewed by the Supreme
Court after the trial judge granted a motion to dismiss as to two
defendants. In interpreting Rule 54 (b) and Rule 111 (a) and the
requirement that there be a final judgment before a writ of error
could issue, the court held that a judgment or decree is not final
which determines the action as to less than all of the defendants
unless the requirements of Rule 54 (b) are met.
RULE 55
In Radinsky v. Kripke39 the sole question was whether the trial
court abused its discretion in dismissing an action with prejudice for
failure to prosecute. Dissolution of a law partnership formed the
background of the action. The trial court appointed a referee to
conduct an accounting and the hearings were delayed over a long
period of time. Dismissal took place under Rule 18 of the district
court, which provides:
Dismissal of Actions-Failure to Prosecute, etc. Pay-
ment of Costs
Sec. 1. The Clerk of this Court, at the opening of the
September Term of each year, shall report to the Judges
such cases as may be pending in their respective Civil Di-
visions, in which no order or progress has been made and
entered of record for a period of twelve (12) months. All
such cases shall be dismissed with prejudice thirty days
after service of written notice by the Clerk to attorneys of
record or parties, at their last known addresses, unless good
37 Id. at 343-44.
38 357 P.2d 652 (Colo. 1960).
39 354 P.2d 500 (Colo. 1960).
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cause shall be shown why the same should not be dis-
missed.
40
The trial court found that the plaintiff was under a duty to go for-
ward and did not show diligence. In reversing the judgment of dis-
missal and directing that a new referee be appointed to carry out
the accounting, the court said:
It has been held in Colorado that a delay occasioned
by the failure of an officer of the court (the Clerk) in cir-
cumstances where the plaintiff has not failed to comply
with any legal requirements, is not grounds for dismissal
for failure to prosecute. [citations] . . . This rule extends
to delays occasioned by all officers of the court, including
masters and referees.
An additional reason also exists requiring reversal
here.
If the Findings and Judgment of the trial court were
meant to be a default judgment, then we find no compli-
ance with our Rules of Civil Procedure which provide how
judgments by default must be entered after proper motion
therefor with notice (Rule 55). And if this be considered
an involuntary dismissal it failed to comply with Rule 41
R.C.P. Colo., which also requires a motion; and then notice
thereof must be given as required by Rule 5 ....
Also, it is obvious that the trial court failed to follow
its own Rule XVIII, which did not apply. This is so because
no written notice was given as required therein and if it
had been given then this record discloses 'good cause' why
the action should not have been dismissed.41
RULE 56
The Supreme Court did not extend its interpretation of Rule
56 in 1960, although it did sustain two summary judgments. The
law on summary judgments was reannounced by the court in the
case of Credit Inv. & Loan Co. v. Guar. Bank & Trust Co.42 The
plaintiff in his complaint charged breach of contract and malicious
interference with contract. The defendant interposed a motion to
dismiss and a motion for summary judgment, and the motions were
granted. The defense motions were not supported by affidavit but
testimony was taken and interrogatories were offered to buttress
the motions. In reversing the trial court for dismissing the com-
plaint and issuing a summary judgment, the Supreme Court found
that there were genuine issues of fact and repeated the oft-quoted
law on summary judgments:
Granting summary judgment on the record before us
was error. A summary judgment may be granted only
where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.
Rule 56, R.C.P. Colo. We have many times held, and again
reiterate that a summary judgment is a drastic remedy,
never warranted except in the complete absence of any
40 Id. at 501.
41 1.4 at 51)2.
42 353 P.2d 1098 (Colo. 1960).
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genuine issue of material fact. All doubts with respect
thereto must be resolved against the mover [citations] ....
' * * It requires no strained mental exercise to reach
the conclusion that each of plaintiff's alleged claims, if
proved, states a' claim upon which relief may be granted,
and that none is vulnerable to a motion to dismiss.
43
In Avery v. City of Fort Collins44 the court again reversed a
summary judgment that came before the court with a claim that
res judicata barred the prosecution of the action before the trial
court. The plaintiff had commenced a class action for a declaratory
judgment, and that action was dismissed on the defendant's motion,
and the judgment affirmed by the Supreme Court when the plain-
tiff elected to stand on the complaint filed.
The second action, Avery v. City of Fort Collins,45 was a tax-
payer's action seeking a different remedy than that sought in the
first case and caused the court to lay down the following law:
In this jurisdiction the dismissal of a case without pre-
judice does not bar a subsequent suit by the same parties
on the same cause of action .... Here the actions were not
identical, the plaintiffs appear in a different capacity and
additional parties are involved.
Defendants argue that a writ of error to this court
from the original judgment resulting in affirmance, alters
the rule. The plaintiffs having 'elected to stand on their
complaint' rather than amend it initially, cannot maintain
a second suit. We are persuaded, however, that the rule
posed by defendants applies only when the original judg-
ment is entered on the merits. . . . Where a defective or
improper complaint has been dismissed without prejudice
and review sought in the Supreme Court resulting in an
affirmance, a new action may thereafter be commenced .... 46
In accord was Hizel v. Howard47 where the court said: ...
For the plea [of res judicata] to be a complete defense,
there must be 'identity of subject matter, identity of cause
of action, identity of persons to the action and identity of
capacity in the persons for which or against whom the
claim is made.' Judgment on the merits precludes not only
matters determined and actually litigated but also all mat-
ters pertaining to the issues which could or might have
been litigated therein. .... 48
The court did not hesitate to approve the granting of a sum-
mary judgment in Vessells v. Davidson Chevrolet"0 where a new
action was commenced to relitigate and collaterally attack former
judgments.
In King Collection Bureau v. Burns5" a summary judgment was
also upheld. The facts behind the court's decision were that the
note which was the subject of the suit contained a provision allow-
ing payment in cash or by the surrender of securities which had
43 Id. at 1100.
44 131 Colo. 34, 278 P.2d 1017 (1955).
45 351 P.2d 286 (Colo. 1960).
46 Id. at 287-88.
47 354 P.2d 611, 612 (Colo. 1960).
48 See Benson v. Bottger, 354 P.2d 601 (Colo. 1960).
49 355 P.2d 121 (Colo. 1960).
50 354 P.2d 609 (Colo. 1960).
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been purchased and paid for in part by the execution of a note and
the entire transaction was set out in the pleadings. The plaintiff
attempted to urge a parol agreement, but the Supreme Court, in
sustaining the summary judgment, found that there was no issue
of fact to be determined and that any ambiguities had been disposed
of through the pleadings.
In a bailment action, Lutz v. Miller,5 ' a motion for summary
judgment was interposed after an answer was filed. The answer
contained a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted and the trial court sustained the mo-
tion for summary judgment. In analyzing the complaint and the
issues, the Supreme Court held that the complaint was sufficient
and that there were issues of fact yet to be determined and remand-
ed the case for further proceedings.
RULE 59
The procedure necessary to protect a successful jury verdict
that fails to withstand a motion for a new trial was clarified by the
court in Chartier v. Winslow Crane Serv. Co.52 and Mobley v. Cart-
wright.5
In Chartier v Winslow Crane Serv. Co.54 the plaintiff won a
verdict of $50,531 from the jury and then saw his verdict fail when
the trial judge granted the defendant's motion for a new trial. The
plaintiff elected to stand on the record as made and the trial court
dismissed the action. The Supreme Court in reviewing the record
said that in Colorado the plaintiff may elect to stand on the order
granting the new trial and obtain a dismissal of the action and re-
view of the trial court's order in the Supreme Court. In reinstating
the verdict of the jury and reviewing the record the court said, in
laying down the so-called non-suit rule, that the test on review is
whether there is substantial [though conflicting] evidence in the
record to support the jury verdict. This evidence must be consid-
ered in the light most favorable to plaintiff and the presumptions
favor the verdict rather than the final judgment of dismissal. The
reason for adoption of this test is that the judgment of dismissal is
actually a court determination that the evidence was not substan-
tial and that a motion for dismissal or a non-suit should have been
granted at the end of the plaintiff's evidence.
In a damage action, Mobley v. Cartwright,5  the plaintiff ob-
tained a'jury verdict which did not withstand the defendant's mo-
tion for a new trial. On retrial the defendant was successful and
the plaintiff moved to set aside the verdict in the second trial and
to reinstate the verdict returned by the jury in the first trial on the
allegation that the trial court erred in granting a new trial. The
plaintiff also filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict and a motion for new trial, but both motions were denied. The
Supreme Court found that there was only one final judgment, the
judgment which followed the second trial, and said that the plain-
tiff, if aggrieved by the granting of the motion for new trial, should
have preserved his right to review upon that issue by standing
51 356 P.2d 242 (Colo. 1960).
52 350 P.2d 1044 (Colo. 1960).
53 348 P.2d 379 (Colo. 1960).
54 350 P.2d 1044 (Colo. 1960).
55 348 P.2d 379 (Colo. 1960).
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upon the record as made and affirmed the judgment of the trial
court. When the plaintiff went to trial, he had waived any error
that the court might have committed in the first trial.
RULE 65
A tax-exempt status was in issue in City and County of Denver
v. Spears Free Clinic and Hosp. for Poor Children.6 Spears claimed
exemption from taxation as a charitable institution under Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 137-12-3 (8) and article X, section 5 of the Colorado
Constitution and sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive re-
lief in the trial court. The trial court granted the relief, and on
writ of error the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and held
that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the issue and that
there was substantial evidence in the record to support the trial
court's ruling.
In Crosby v. Watson57 the Supreme Court reviewed the trial
court's denial of an application for a preliminary prohibitory in-
junction. The plaintiffs claimed for their title an easement for in-
gress and egress over the defendant's land and relied solely upon
adverse possession. The trial judge took evidence and viewed the
premises. In affirming the decision of the trial judge, the court said:
Our former decisions, to which we adhere, hold that
the granting or denial of a preliminary injunction is a mat-
ter in the sound discretion of the trial court and that its de-
termination with reference thereto will not be disturbed
except in case of abuse of discretion .... It is equally well
settled that the findings of fact of the trial court, if based
upon substantial competent evidence, are binding upon this
court, and that we will not substitute our conclusions from
the facts for those of a trial court. This is so even though
there be credible evidence warranting findings different
from those of the trial court....
• Plaintiffs insist that a preliminary injunction should
have been ordered to preserve the status quo of the parties
until a determination of their rights can be made upon final
56 450 P.2d 1057 (Colo. 1960).
57 355 P.2d 958 (Colo. 1960).
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hearing. Had a clear right to a temporary injunction been
sh6wn, plaintiffs' contention would be correct. Injunctive
relief should not be loosely granted. Plaintiffs, as well as
the defendants, will have an opportunity to present their
case in full at a trial on the merits.
Concluding as we do that the matter was one resting
in the sound discretion of the trial court, the order denying
the motion for a preliminary injunction is affirmed.5 8
Of like effect is Allen v. City and County of Denver, 9 where
the Supreme Court sustained the trial court's refusal of a temporary
injunction. The accumulation of water in southwest Denver pre-
cipitated the suit, and an extensive hearing on the injunction issue
followed. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the
denial of an injunction and affirmed the judgment as being within
the sound discretion of the court.
RULE 83
To obtain uniformity and to prevent conflicts in the rules of the
various courts the Supreme Court amended Rule 83 on December
8, 1960, to read as follows:
Each trial court by action of a majority of its judges
may from time to time make and amend rules governing
its practice not inconsistent with these rules nor inconsist-
ent with any directive of the Supreme Court. Local rules
adopted hereunder shall not restrict the authority of the
presiding judge of said court to adopt and enforce admin-
istrative rules, not inconsistent with any directive of the
Supreme Court, relating to assignment of cases, dockets,
and procedures for effecting a just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of causes pending before such court. Copies
of proposed rules or amendments to be made by any court,
before their adoption, shall be furnished to the Supreme
Court for its approval. In all cases not provided for herein,
trial courts may regulate their practice in any manner not
inconsistent with these rules.
RULE 98
A motion for change of venue was held to be a matter of right
in Cliff v. Gleason.60 The principal case involved construction of a
listing agreement that was to be performed in Jefferson County
where the defendant was served and resided. The trial court denied
the motion for a change of venue and found for the plaintiff. The
court said: "When, as here, an application sufficient in form, un-
contradicted, and supported by allegations in the plaintiff's com-
plaint itself, is made for a change of place of trial, the Court has




Burt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Barth62 appeared for the second time
before the court. In Barth v. Burt Chevrolet, Inc.,63 the court had
59 Id. at 959-60.
59 351 P.2d 390 (Colo. 1960).
60 351 P.2d 394 (Colo. 1960).
61 Id. at 396-97.
62 355 P.2d 538 (Colo. 1960),
63 140 Colo. 128, 342 P.2d 637 (1959).
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reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. Barth filed a mo-
tion to dissolve lhe Writ of attachment after the case was remand-
ed and the motion was granted. On writ of error it was urged that
the motion which was sustained in the trial court had been previ-
ously urged in the trial court and could have been questioned in
the first proceeding before the Supreme Court, and in answer to
the contention the court said:
* . * Rule 102 (aa) R.C.P. Colo. provides in pertinent
part that: '* * * Any order by which an attachment or
garnishment is released or sustained is a final judgment.'
The original judgment entered by the trial court which
sustained the attachment was a final judgment. No writ
of error issued to review it. The parties to the action were
then, and now are, bound by that judgment.
• * ' The final judgment upholding the writ of attach-
ment, not having been questioned in the proceedings on





The restrictions on the use of original proceedings was made
clear by the court in two decisions:
In Bristol v. The County Court, 5 the court had to determine
whether the defendant in the district court had made a record
which entitled him to a writ of prohibition. The defendant was
sued on a promissory note in the county court and gave notice that
he would take the deposition of non-resident officers of the plaintiff
corporation. The parties named in the notice never appeared for
depositions so the defendant moved to require attendance or in the
alternative a dismissal of the complaint. The county court denied
the motion and set the case for trial. The defendant thereupon
commenced a proceeding in the district court seeking prohibition
against further proceedings in the county court and alleging that
the court had abused its discretion in refusing to require the plain-
tiff corporation's officers to appear for a deposition or forego the
prosecution of its complaint. The district court issued a citation to
show cause. At the hearing in the district court the county court
defended its ruling on the basis of the defendant's lack of showing
of adequate cause or the necessity for putting the plaintiff to the
expense of bringing its officers into Colorado for the deposition
when other means of discovery were available. The district court
held that the county court had not abused its discretion and that
the actions of the defendant were designed to obtain review of the
county court's ruling rather than to show an abuse of discretion.
On writ of error to the Supreme Court to review the judgment of
the district court, it was held that a sufficient showing was not
made to justify the use of prohibition, and that the district court
properly discharged the rule under Rule 106 (a) (4).
The rule to show cause was again discharged in Retallack v,
Police Court"6 when an original proceeding in the nature of prohibi-
tion was filed in the Supreme Court challenging the jurisdiction of
64 355 P.2d 538, 539-40 (1960).
65 352 P.2d 785 (Colo. 1960).
66 351 P.2d 884 (Colo. 1960).
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a municipal court in Colorado Springs to try the petitioner on a
charge of reckless and careless driving. The basis of the petitioner's
claim was the now famous Merris case.67 The Supreme Court said:
It is to be noted that although the Merris case ... did
establish the offense of drunken driving to be a statewide
concern and governed by state statute, the most significant
contribution to law in this state which arose out of that
case was a guaranty to all citizens that trials for municipal
violations in municipal courts would be in accordance with
criminal process. That being the case, no person charged
under a municipal ordinance can be prejudiced by leaving
as much of local law intact as can be done without violat-
ing individual rights or undermining state sovereignty.
6 8
In Hollander v. Jacobucci,9 an original proceeding in the na-
ture of mandamus or prohibition, the court made a rule to show
cause permanent. In the principal case, the parents of a minor filed
a complaint in the county court charging their minor daughter with
delinquency. Over the protest of the minor's parents, an attorney
sought leave to appear and defend the minor in the county court.
The county judge prohibited the attorney from appearing, and the
Supreme-Court in its ruling held that all persons are entitled to
counsel of their own choosing and that the selection of counsel can-
not be dictated by those who instigated the action.
In Van Gundy v. O'Kane7° the complainant sought a writ in the
nature of prohibition to prevent further proceedings in the County
Court of Jefferson County on traffic charges which previously
formed the basis of a complaint before a justice of the peace court
in Jefferson County. The district attorney nolle prosequied in the
justice court, with the approval of the court, so that he might pro-
secute the traffic violations in the county court. Van Gundy filed a
motion to dismiss in the county court on the ground that the entry
of the nolle prosequi in the justice court for the purpose of refiling
the action in a court of concurrent jurisdiction did not relieve the
justice court of jurisdiction and enable the county court to proceed.
The admitted reason for the district attorney's action was that Van
Gundy had the audacity to ask for a jury trial in the justice of the
peace court. In condemning the practice, the court elected to treat
the complainant's motion to dismiss as a plea in abatement in the
county court and sent the matter back for further proceedings in
the justice court.
B. Quo Warranto
In People ex rel Mijares v. Kniss7 1 the court considered the his-
tory behind the use of quo warranto and determined that the reme-
dy was not available to oust officers of an unincorporated labor
union on the ground that their election was effected by devious and
unfair means. The district attorney refused to prosecute, and a suit
under Rule 106 (a) (3) followed.
In sustaining the trial court's judgment in favor of the defend-
ants the court said:
67 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958).
68 351 P.2d 884, 886 (Colo. 1960).
69 349 P.2d 567 (Colo. 1960).
70 351 P.2d 282 (Colo. 1960).
71 357 P.2d 352 (Colo. 1960).
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[Rule 106 (a) (3)] . . . furnishes a substitute for the
common law prerogative writ of quo warranto and the
former statutory remedy in the nature of quo warranto.
Notwithstanding the former remedies have been supplanted
by Rule 106 (a) (3), it must be remembered that '[e]ven
under the Rules of Civil Procedure the substantive aspects
of remedial writs are preserved, and relief of the same na-
ture as was formerly provided in such proceedings may be
granted in accordance with precedents established under
the old practice.' (Emphasis supplied.) [citations] ....
While the procedural pattern has been simplified, the
substance of what constitutes the basis of quo warranto re-
lief remains the same. In order to prevail, proof of the
substantive elements authorizing such relief should be of
the same kind, quality and quantity as would have war-
ranted a favorable judgment under the older forms. [cita-
tions]. . . . 'The various procedural changes * * * do not
affect the basic purposes for which the writ was orginally
designed' [citations] ....
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may not be utilized by members of a labor union to dis-
lodge other members from offices which they hold in the
organization. We believe, first, that the context of the rule
limits its application to public offices, and second, that a
construction of the rule extending its application to test
the title or right to a private office would invalidate it be-
cause such interpretation would result in an encroachment




In Colorado ex rel Gentles v. Barnholt73 the court found that
quo warranto was the proper procedure to test the validity of the
election of corporate officers and directors by reason of the fact
that a corporation is a creature of statute. Suit was filed by a group
of stockholders of Western Oil Fields, Inc., after the district attorney
refused to institute an action. The complaint alleged that certain
stock was issued to a non-resident after a contested corporate elec-
tion was held and that the stock was then voted retroactively to
obtain victory for the incumbent slate of directors. A motion to dis-
miss for failure to join the late voting, non-resident stockholder
was sustained in the trial court and reversed on writ of error. The
defendants contended that the non-resident stockholder was an in-
dispensable party and that the plaintiffs had also failed to join the
corporation in the suit, which also came within the category of an
indispensable party. The Supreme Court agreed that the corpora-
tion was a necessary party, but held that the non-resident stock-
holder was not a necessary party. In the court's opinion, it was
clear that if personal service of process was required upon the non-
resident stockholder, then the shareholders' right of action would
be destroyed or would have to be held in abeyance until the non-
resident happened to venture into Colorado where he could be
served. Such a result, the court felt, would deprive the plaintiffs
of a remedy. The case was remanded to the trial court with direc-
tions to vacate the judgment of dismissal and to grant leave to the
plaintiffs to bring in the corporation as a party defendant and then
determine the matter on the merits.
In People v. Colorado Hiqh School Activities Ass'n,7 4 a com-
plaint was filed as a class action on behalf of a group of citizens,
residents, taxpayers, and voters under the provisions of Rule 106
(a) (3) questioning the legal existence, constitutionality, and validi-
ty of the operations and expenditures of the Colorado High School
Activities Association. The complaint was captioned quo warranto,
injunctive, and other relief. The respondents moved to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. The motion was granted, but no formal judgment of dis-
missal entered. On writ of error, the court pointed out that the re-
lief sought was properly obtainable by way of an action for a
declaratory judgment or an action in the nature of quo warranto
and found that the complaint was sufficient to test the franchise in
issue. The complaint before the court asked relief against parties
who were not named as defendants and were not served with pro-
cess, and, therefore, who were indispensable parties not before the
court. The case was remanded by the Supreme Court to the trial
72 Id. at 353-54.
73 358 P.2d 466 (Colo. 1960).
74 349 P.2d 381 (Colo. 1960).
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court with directions to allow additional parties to be added and
for proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion.
An original proceeding in quo warranto, Warren v. People,75
sought to question the right of a county commissioner to hold office,
but the issues were found to be moot after the commissioner, whose
right to office was questioned, resigned. The court directed that
the trial court determine issues which appeared in the original
complaint but which were not before the court.
C. Non-Resident Motorist
Service of process under the Colorado Non-Resident Service
LaW7 6 was questioned in three cases. Original proceedings were
filed in the Supreme Court under Rule 106 alleging lack of jurisdic-
tion in Morrison v. Dist. Court77 and United States Fid. & Gar. Co.
v. District Court.78 In Morrison v Dist. Court79 the complainant
sought to prohibit the trial court from requiring further pleading
in an action pending in the District Court wherein he appeared as
defendant. An automobile accident gave rise to a complaint based
upon the family purpose doctrine, and service was made under the
Colorado Non-Resident Motorist Act.80 The complainant filed a
motion to quash the service which was supported by an affidavit
alleging non-residence, absence from the state at the time of the
accident, and the fact that the automobile was not a family car. The
complainant also denied the authority of the secretary of state to
accept service as his agent and contended that his son, who was the
driver of the car, was not his agent, servant, or employee, and that
he held the title to the car as a security device only. In reaffirming
its earlier pronouncement in Carlson v. Dist. Court8 the court held
that the affidavit and motion filed by the complainant was couched
with conclusions of law and was an attempt to equivocate. It said
that where the conclusions of law set forth by the complainant were
contradicted by facts appearing in the affidavits, the trial court was
correct in adopting the facts rather than the conclusions. The court,
in upholding the jurisdiction of the trial court, said that if it ap-
peared in the trial court that the automobile involved in the acci-
dent was not within the family purpose doctrine, the complainant
could not be held liable.
In General Ins. Co. of Am. v. O'Day 8 2 judgment was obtained
by default after service was effected upon the secretary of state and
a summons, complaint, and notice of service upon the secretary of
state was sent to the defendant by registered mail and was returned
marked "unclaimed." After default judgment was entered by the
trial court, the plaintiff looked to the insurance carrier for payment
of the judgment. The Supreme Court found that the judgment was
void and that each step set forth in the non-resident service of pro-
cess statute was jurisidictional and had to be strictly complied with.
The defendant had not received or refused to accent the registered
mail, and, therefore, service was never completed. The judgment
was reversed.
75 354 P.2d 1021 (Colo. 1960).
76 Colo. Rev. Stat. 9§ 13-8-1 to 13-8-.4 (1953).
77 355 P.2d 660 (Colo. 1960).
78 353 P.2d 1093 (Colo. 1960).
79 355 P.2d 660 (Colo. 1960).
80 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-8-1 (1953).
81 116 Colo. 330, 180 P.2d 525 (1957).
82 356 P.2d 888 (Colo. 1960).
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Original proceedings were also looked to in United States Fid.
& Guar. Co. v. Dist. Court 3 to bar further action in the trial court.
The complainant was garnisheed as the insurance carrier of a serv-
ice man from Connecticut who was involved in an accident in Colo-
rado while stationed on a military base in Colorado. Judgment was
obtained by default in the trial court after service was effected un-
der the non-resident motorist statute. In an answer to the garnish-
ment, the complainant alleged that the court was proceeding with-
out jurisdiction. In holding that a service man is a non-resident for
the purpose of service, the court set out the purpose of the statute
and discharged the rule, thereby upholding the service:
The typical case which the statute is apparently de-
signed to meet is where the defendant is only transiently
operating a motor vehicle on the Colorado highways, al-
though by its terms it is not limited to one making a con-
tinuous journey through the State, but covers any case
where a non-resident, operating a motor vehicle in this
State, causes damage.
Upon the evidence submitted to the trial court it found
that Shea was a non-resident of Colorado at the time of the
accident, and there is ample competent evidence to sustain
this finding. We cannot interfere with a finding so sup-
ported S4
RULE 111
The Supreme Court refused to countenance the instructions
given on damages in Kendall v. Hargrave.5 Neither party objected
to any of the instructions given by the court, but the court, looking
to the provisions of Rule 111 (f), found error appearing on the face
of the record and in the interest of justice reversed the rulin- of
the trial court.
RULE 120
The court held in Hastings v. Security Thrift & Mortgage Co. 8 6
that Rule 98 had no application to a proceeding under Rule 120, and
that a sale accomplished under Rule 120 on a note secured by a deed
of trust did not constitute an adversary proceeding subject to review
by writ of error. In dismissing the writ of error, the court declared
that there was no requirement under Rule 120 that a suit be insti-
tuted in the county where the property described was located when
sale was sought under the powers of the deed of trust.
83 353 P.2d 1093 (Colo. 1960).
X4 Id. at 1094.
85 359 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1960).
S6 357 P.2d 919 (Colo. 1960).
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
By HAROLD E. HURST*
A great many constitutional law, and relatively few administra-
tive law, decisions were handed down by the Colorado Supreme
Court in 1960. Only those decisions of major and current impor-
tance are discussed here.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Sovereign Immunity of the State from Suit
That a person who deals with the state in a contractual or
quasi-contractual situation may recover against the state for dam-
ages resulting from breach of contract seems to be settled in Colo-
rado.' The theory applied in actions in contract brought against the
state was, in Ace Flying Serv., Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Agricul-
ture,2 that the state, in entering into a contractual relationship, im-
pliedly waived its immunity from suit. However, in the Ace Flying
Serv. case, a concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Moore argues at
great length and in eloquently sweeping passages, that "Whatever
may have been the rule heretofore, I am of the firm opinion that
any citizen may resort to litigation to protect his life, liberty or
property even though his adversary be the sovereign state of Colo-
rado. The constitution cannot be so nullified as to permit the state
to deprive a citizen of 'property' without due process of law."'3 Some
of the language in Mr. Justice Moore's concurring opinion is singu-
larly reminiscent of language in the majority opinion of Boxberger.
It is important to note, in analyzing cases decided in 1960, that
Mr. Justice Moore held the opinion in Ace Flying Serv., Inc. that
sovereign immunity has never been a part of Colorado law and that
the Colorado constitution was so written that every person would
have his day in court "even though his adversary be the sovereign
state of Colorado." He arrived at that conclusion by employing the
following language:
It is a historical fact, that when the constitution of the
State of Colorado was adopted it was patterned largely
upon the constitution of the State of Illinois. The constitu-
tion of that state then, and even now, contains a provision
as follows:
"The state of Illinois shall never be made defendant in
any court of law or equity."
That a similar provision was not incorporated in the
Colorado Constitution, although present in the instrument
which unquestionably was used as a model, is persuasive
evidence that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was dis-
carded by its framers .... 4
Shortly after Ace Flying Serv., Inc., the court was called upon
*Professor Hurst is Acting Dean of the University of Denver College of Law.
1 Boxberger v. State Highway Dep't, 126 Colo. 438, 250 P.2d 1007 (1952); see also Ace Flying
Serv., Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Agriculture, 136 Colo. 19, 314 P.2d 278 (1957).
2 136 Colo. 19, 314 P.2d 278 (1957).
3 Id. at 31, 314 P.2d at 284.
4 Id. at 33, 314 P.2d at 285.
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to decide whether the sovereign immunity of the state prevented
recovery in Colorado Racing Comm'n v. Brush Racing Ass'n5 of the
breakage, which had been paid under protest to the state and which
was held, in an earlier decision, Centennial Turf Club v. Racing
Comm'n,6 to be the property of the racing organization. The ques-
tion there was whether, under the parimutuel racing act,7 the
breakage belonged to the state or to the track. The court found
nothing in the act which required the payment of the breakage to
the state, and consequently the license of Centennial Turf Club to
conduct parimutuel betting seems not to have been conditioned
upon payment of the breakage to the state.
Relying upon Centennial, the plaintiff in Brush Racing Ass'n
sought to recover payments of breakage which it had made in past
years to the state. Again it is important to note, in analyzing the
1960 decisions, that neither Centennial nor Brush Racing Ass'n can
be considered as cases based upon claims sounding in contract. But
in the latter case, judgment for the association was affirmed by the
court in an opinion by Mr. Justice Hall without dissents or non-
participants which said:
Counsel for the State vigorously urge the doctrine that
Colorado cannot be sued in its sovereign capacity, that the
State enjoys sovereign immunity from suit, and cite num-
erous decisions of this Court so holding. The cases relied
upon are outmoded by more recent pronouncements of this
5 136 Colo. 279, 316 P.2d 582 (1957).
6 129 Colo. 529, 271 P.2d 1046 (1954).
7 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 129-2-9 (1953).
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Court. In Colorado "sovereign immunity" may be a proper
subject for discussion by students of mythology but finds
no haven or refuge in this Court. Boxberger v. Highway
Dept., [citation] . . . squarely in point and is a complete
answer to the State's archaic contention.8
With that language, Pandora's box was opened, and small won-
der. The sweep of the language adopted by a unanimous court in
Brush Racing Ass'n was so broad as to admit of no exceptions or
limitations. Sovereign immunity was dead. The natural and prob-
able result was the filing of numerous actions against municipali-
ties, counties and the state to recover damages for personal injuries
alleged to have been the result of tortious acts of governmental
servants.
Five such cases were decided by the Supreme Court in 1960,
and astonished counsel and disappointed litigants discovered that
a part, at least, of the doctrine of sovereign immunity had somehow
been resurrected.
The first of such cases, Denver v. Madison,9 reversed a judg-
ment of the district court for the City and County of Denver in
favor of an infant who had been found by the district court to have
been seriously and permanently injured as a result of the negli-
gence of employees of the local city hospital. The reversal was or-
dered by a majority of four of the seven justices, invoking the rule:
Very firmly settled in the law of this state is the rule
that a municipality is not liable for the acts of officers,
agents or employees, committed by them in the discharge
of functions or duties which are governmental in nature
and which are "exercised in virtue of certain attributes of
sovereignty delegated to it for the welfare and protection
of its inhabitants.' 10
Counsel for the p!aintiff had relied upon the earlier cases" in
which there was not a whisper of limitation in the eloquently eu-
logized demise of sovereign immunity. But, said the court: "The
rule announced in those cases has no application to actions ex de-
licto." The court added that Ace Flying Serv., Brush Racing Ass'n
and Stone v. Currigan12 were cases "in which the doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity from suit in actions sounding in contract was re-
pudiated." By what strained construction Brush Racing Ass'n was
converted into an action "sounding in contract" we are not told.
In a second hotly contested case, Liber v. Flor,13 the Supreme
Court divided again in a four to three decision in affirming a judg-
ment of the trial court dismissing an action against a county for
damages allegedly resulting from tortious acts of county employees.
The court, in affirming, stated its reason as follows:
This court has not heretofore held that the state is lia-
ble in damages for the negligence of its servants; nor has
it been held that other governmental corporate entities are
8 136 Colo. 279, 284. 316 P.2d 582, 585 (1957).
9 351 P.2d 826 (Colo. 1960).
10 Id. at 829.
11 Ace Flying Serv., Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Agriculture, 136 Colo. 19, 314 P.2d 278 (1957);
Colorado Racing Comm'n v. Brush Racing Ass'n, 136 Colo. 279, 316 P.2d 582 (1957); and Stone v.
Currigan, 138 Colo. 442, 334 P.2d 740 (1959).
12 Stone v. Currigan, 138 Colo. 442 ?34 P.2d 740 (1959).
13 353 P.2d 590 'Colo. 1960).
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liable for the tortious acts of their servants performing
duties in furtherance of a governmental function, as distin-
guished from a proprietary function. Numerous decisions
of this court have established the rule of no liability in
such cases.'
4
An interesting feature of the case just discussed is one which
will no doubt lead all administrative officers of cities, counties,
school districts, the state, and many kinds of political subdivisions
to make themselves personally judgment proof as soon as possible
after election or appointment. It is the ruling in Liber v. Flor that
although the county could not be liable for the torts of its em-
ployees, the county Commissioners as individuals could, neverthe-
less, "be held liable in all respects as other tort-feasors."''5 In the
case under discussion, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
dismissal of the action against the county commissioners, named in
the complaint individually as defendants, and sent the case back
for trial upon the issue of negligence of the commissioners, as in-
dividuals, in the supervision of their employees.
In three other cases coming before the court in 1960,16 the ques-
tion of the liability of the state or a county for torts of their agents
was decided adversely to the plaintiffs, all of whom appear to have
relied upon the sweeping, unrestrained, unlimited and unanimous
ruling in Brush Racing Ass'n. What appeared to be solid ground
upon which the doctrine of sovereign immunity was laid to rest
turned out to be the sinking sand of grandiose obiter dictum, trap-
ping the plaintiffs and carrying down with them the price of costly
appellate proceedings.
B. Definiteness and Certainty of Statutes
Two cases in 1960 required decision regarding the constitutional
sufficiency of vague and indefinite satutory definitions of prohibit-
ed conduct.
The most important case, involving most of the major and
minor oil companies, was Flank Oil Co. v. Tennessee Gas Trans.
Co."7 The plaintiff sought injunctive relief from allegedly injurious
violations, by the defendants, of the Colorado Unfair Practices Act"M
which prohibits sales of merchandise at less than cost for the pur-
pose of injuring competitors and destroying competition. The act
defined what was meant by "cost" with considerable particularity.
The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the prohibited con-
duct was stated in terms so vague and indefinite that persons sub-
ject to it could not determine whether theirs was a lawful course
of conduct, and on its face irreconcilable with the due process re-
quirements of article XIV of the United States Constitution. The
trial court dismissed, but was reversed in the Supreme Court. The
court felt that the statutory definition, which included specific
kinds of expenses that were to be considered in determining "cost,"
was not too indefinite on its face, and that evidence must be taken
before it could be determined that the complexity of the oil com-
14 Id. at 592.
15 Ibid.
16 Faber v. State, 353 P.2d 609 (Colo. 1960); Berger v. Dep't of Highways, 353 P.2d 612 (Colo.
1960); M. & M. Oil Transp. v. County Comm'rs, 353 P.2d 613 (Colo. 1960).
17 349 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1960).
18 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 55-2-1, -2 (1953).
DICTA
MAY-JUNE, 1961
pany business and production practices made it impossible to apply
the statutory standards.
Another case, Memorial Trusts, Inc. v. Beery,19 turned on the
same question-whether the statutory definition of prohibited con-
duct was adequate to meet the constitutional requirements of the
due process clause of the state constitution 20 and the fourteenth
amendment of the federal constitution. The statute 21 required that
all funds received as premiums on prepaid funeral benefits "shall
be invested, until properly expendable, in securities . . . " and vio-
lations were punishable as crimes. The gist of the statutory re-
quirement was to require trustees to hold the assets "until properly
expendable," but nowhere in the statute were "proper expendi-
tures" defined or identified. Quoting from the leading case -2 2 on the
subject, the court struck down the statute.
These two cases seem to be quite consistent and compatible.
And in their compatibility would seem to lie a lesson for legislative
draftsmen. In Flank Oil Co.,23 a statute which prohibited sale be-
low "cost"-a term obviously open to questionable meanings-in-
19 356 P.2d 884 (Colo. 1960).
20 Colo. Const. crt. II, 9 25.
21 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 72-17-1 to -7 (1953).
22 Conclly v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 355 (1926).
23 Supra note 17.
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cluded other provisions defining that term with particularity suf-
ficient that the court thought it might, without guessing, determine
from the evidence whether a defendant was in compliance or vio-
lation. But in Memorial Trusts, Inc., the mandate that funds be
held "until properly expendable," unaided by any statutory lan-
guage as to what were or were not "proper expenditures," neces-
sarily required persons to guess whether their conduct complied
with, or violated, the legislative policy and consequently violated
the standards of definiteness and certainty required by the due
process clauses of the state and federal constitutions.
C. More Merris Confusion
The wake of the Merris case2 4 grows wider, and with it the con-
fusion of both court and counsel as to just what Merris stands for.
Primary responsibility for the confusion rests solidly with the court,
which at one time holds one way and subsequently another, with-
out persuasive logic, that municipal ordinances can or cannot be
enforced.
A trio of cases decided in 1960 added to the growing list of
examples of municipal regulation either: (1) sustained as involv-
ing matters of local and municipal concern, on the one hand, or (2)
struck down as involving matters of state-wide concern. Retallack
v. Police Court of Colorado Springs2 5 held that reckless and care-
less driving belonged in the first category even though there exist-
ed a state statute26 regulating the matter. Gazotti v. Denver
-2 7
placed the regulation and punishment of larceny in the second cate-
gory and struck down the Denver ordinance under which Gazotti
was convicted. Mr. Justice Hall, specially concurring in the latter
case, was led to announce his dissatisfaction with the apparent lack
of logic in the two decisions:
As I view the situation, it is impossible to reconcile
Retallack with the case at bar [Gazotti ]-they are parallel
cases-all the arguments presented in Retallack can be
urged with equal force in this case-all the arguments ad-
vanced in this case apply with equal force to Retallack.
Any effort to distinguish the cases can lead only to
frustration, futility and failure....
Though the majority opinion serves the useful purpose
of giving to Gazotti his freedom . . . it is, as I view it,
wholly inadequate and will, I fear, serve only to create con-
flict and confusion.
2 8
A third case2 9 held that school light legislation was a matter of
local and municipal concern.
Perhaps it is time for the court to re-examine its position and
to begin with fundamental constitutional principles. The legislative
power of the state is vested in the General Assembly,""t not in mu-
nicipalities. Further, the power cannot be redelegated by the Gen-
eral Assembly to municipalities except in those instances in which
24 Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958).
25 351 P.2d 884 (Colo. 1960).
26 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-4-31, -32 (1953).
27 352 P.2d 963 (Colo. 1960).
28 Id. at 965.
29 Pickett v. Boulder, 356 P.2d 489 (Colo. 1960).
30 Colo. Const. art. V, § 1.
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local option is proper.31 Consequently, it becomes material in every
case to determine whether (1) the municipal power claimed is one
which can be given, under the constitution, and (2) whether it was
given by the legislature. The Home Rule Amendment 32 raises
slightly different but no more difficult questions.
It may be granted that application of such principles will still
leave a narrow band of indecision demarking state power from mu-
nicipal power. But that approach would provide some consistent
basis for decision and afford a satisfactory degree of predictability
in most cases.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Administrative law cases in the Supreme Court were surpris-
ingly few in number in 1960, and none of the cases involved novel
or difficult questions.
Perhaps the principal factor contributing to the paucity of
cases in 1960 was the enactment of the Administrative Practices
Act. 33 At any rate, lawyers in Colorado have, for the first time, an
administrative procedure code which serves essentially the same
purpose, in practice before Colorado administrative agencies, that
the Rules of Civil Procedure serve in regulating step by step pro-
cedure in courts of record. Lawyers, armed with the new act, will
not only be better informed as to the rights of their clients, but
will also become instructors to administrative agencies in matters
of procedure.
The act was hammered out over a number of years by the Ad-
ministrative Law Committee of The Colorado Bar Association un-
der the successive chairmanships of Glenn Donaldson, Esq., and
Hubert D. Henry, Esq. It should be studied by all Colorado lawyers.
It will eliminate much of the arbitrariness formerly occurring in
administrative hearing procedure and it will forestall many need-
less appeals.
31 See opinion of the justices in In re Municipal Suffroge to Women, 160 Mass. 586, 36 N.E. 488
(1894); Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U.S. 141 (1889); 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations §§ 4.13 to
4.15 (3rd ed. 1949).
32 Colo. Const. art. XX.
33 Colo. Sess. Laws 1959, chs. 33-38.
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CONTRACTS
By PAUL F. GOLDSMITH*
The year 1960 produced sixty or more cases which could be in-
cluded in this review. In order to present most of these cases' very
little space is used for comment. Some of these cases present the
most elementary aspects of contract law. Even the experienced
lawyer can stumble on a typical textbook problem. It is hoped that
reference to this review will shorten your task of getting abreast of
the law.
The law relating to rescission based on fraud, undue influence,
mistake and related matters is greatly clarified in numerous 1960
cases.
The classification of cases chosen here may be far from ideal.
Some cases could have been reviewed under more than one head-
ing. The headings used are intended to give insight in a very gen-
eral way.
I. CONSIDERATION
The case of Adjustment Bureau v. Rogers" arises out of a dance
studio contract. Rogers, having entered into a "non-cancellable
negotiable contract" with "Arthur Murray Studios," took some in-
struction and ended up owing a substantial sum to the studio. This
contract was referred for collection to the bureau and upon a threat
of garnishment, Rogers signed an "agreement" or note to the bureau
for an increased amount including interest in advance and at-
torney's fees. This action was brought upon the new note. Rogers
claimed the new note was invalid for lack of consideration and that
it was executed under duress. The mere threat of garnishment was
held insufficient to justify a submission of the question of duress
to the jury. On the plea of lack of consideration the case was sub-
mitted to the jury which rendered a verdict in favor of the de-
fendant. Judgment was reversed and a new trial ordered so that
the issue of consideration for the new note could be determined
under proper instructions. The question being whether the bureau
expressly or impliedly undertook, with authority from the studio,
to refrain from enforcing the original note in consideration of the
execution of the note sued upon. Unless such forebearance is shown
to have been the consideration for the execution of the new note,
there was no consideration for it, since the studio would still be at
liberty to sue upon the original note. At the time defendant gave
the new note, it was uncertain who owned the original note and
the effect the new note was to have upon the original contract.
The case of Wilson v. Girley3 stands for the proposition that
mere inadequacy in the price or in the subject matter by itself, un-
accompanied by other inequitable incidents, is not a sufficient
ground for canceling an executed or executory contract. The plain-
tiff sought to cancel a deed of property he had made and delivered
* Mr. Goldsmith is a member of the Denver and Colorado Bar As'sns, member of the Denver firm
of Sears & Goldsmith, and Instructor at the University of Denver College of Law.
I Forty-nine cases are reviewed.
2 354 P.2d 605 (Colo. 1960).
3 357 P.2d 932 (Colo. 1960).
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to defendant. Plaintiff had lived for about nine months at defen-
dant's home without payment of rent and there was evidence to
indicate that the parties had intended a later marriage. The con-
sideration for the deed, as stated in a signed agreement, was de-
fendant's many services and kindnesses and plaintiff's desire to
compensate the defendant for such services and to provide for her
after plaintiff's death unless she should, before that time, marry
someone other than plaintiff.4 About nine months later, plaintiff
left defendant's home. The parties were never married. At close
of plaintiff's evidence, defendant's motion to dismiss was granted
and judgment was entered for defendant. This judgment was af-
firmed.
The case of Sargent v. Crandall5 deals with a crop sharing ar-
rangement under which Crandall occupied Sargent's land, agreeing
to drill and equip one well with Sargent agreeing to pay for Cran-
dall's installation of the other two wells. If Crandall vacated before
the end of five years, Sargent was to pay for the well Crandall
drilled and equipped. Sargent had prepared a written agreement
on these terms and delivered it, unsigned, to Crandall who signed
it but never returned it to Sargent. Crandall vacated after two
years. The parties tried to get a loan for Sargent in order that he
might reimburse Crandall, but Sargent was unable to secure such
a loan to pay the cost of the first well and the unpaid bills on the
second. Sargent appeals from an adverse judgment claiming a
failure to prove a contract and a failure to prove any sum owing.
In affirming the trial court's judgment, the court held that while
the instrument Sargent had prepared created no contractual obliga-
tions per se, because it was not signed, it represented tangible evi-
dence of Sargent's request that Crandall perform certain acts and
furnished a past consideration ". . . for the later promise of Sargent
(in a form of a recognition of the obligation, and efforts to secure
a loan to pay for that which was done), thereby establishing an en-
forceable obligation." This appears to be a proper case for the ap-
plication of the rule that a consideration executed at the request
of the promissor supports a later promise to pay for the considera-
tion provided the consideration was not originally rendered gratu-
itously.6
Gould v. Rite-Way Oil & Inv. Co.7 is an action for specific per-
formance or, in the alternative, for damages. Gould sued on a con-
tract in which defendants agreed to sell certain working interest in
designated oil and/or gas wells for a stated amount with manner
of payment and receipt of deposit clearly stated. The balance due
"to be paid to the sellers by the buyer upon delivery by the sellers
to the buyer of a free and clear marketable title acceptable to the
buyer and a copy of the operating agreement acceptable to the buy-
er." It was defendants contention that the use of the word "ac-
ceptable" destroyed the mutuality of the obligation enabling the
4 The agreement provided that the deed shall stand so long as the grantee, during the lifetime
of the plaintiff, remains unmarried, other than the marriage to plaintiff. It was noted in passing
that plaintiff had failed to raise in his pleading an issue concerning the deed and agreement being
a restraint on marriage and contrary to public policy. Having failed to raise this issue, plaintiff
could not present the issue for the first time on appeal.
5 352 P.2d 676 (Colo. 1960).
6 See Lampleigh v. Brathwait, Hob. 106, 80 Eng. Rep. 255 (1616) a leading English case cited
in support of the decision.
7 351 P.2d 849 (Colo. 1960).
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buyer to refuse to go forward on the ground that title was not ac-
ceptable. The trial court held that the agreement lacked mutuality
of obligation, and it dismissed the complaint. In reversing the dis-
missal, the court construed the word "acceptable" to mean only that
the title tendered should conform to the standard which the law
would regard as clear and merchantable, and that upon tender of
such title, plaintiff would be bound to perform or answer to de-
fendants in damages. Accordingly, there was a binding obligation
to pay the balance upon performance by the sellers of their con-
tractual covenants and therefore the sellers are in position to main-
tain an action against the buyer if he should fail to meet his ob-
ligations, and there exists correlative obligation on the part of the
sellers to convey.8
II. INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACT
The written contract in Skinner v. Davidson, Inc.,9 provided
for sale by plaintiff of its automobile dealership and equipment to
defendant. The price of tools, equipment, furniture and fixtures
was to be determined by appraisal based on ". . . replacement cost.
Replacement cost shall be deemed to be that amount at which any
item could be replaced at retail by an item of comparable kind,
quality, and condition, at seller's place of business."' 1 The parties
chose one Chase to make the appraisal. When Chase submitted his
appraisal, the buyer objected to the method that had been followed.
The appraiser did not seek to discover replacement cost of the items
which were being appraised; he substituted another method, that
of the price of the item new less depreciation. The trial court en-
tered judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant based
upon the report of the appraiser. This judgment was reversed. The
court held that the burden of proving that the agreed basis for ap-
praisal had been carried out was upon the plaintiff who relied upon
the report of the appraiser. The method of computation used by
Chase, namely fair depreciated value, is different from replacement
cost. The court stated that should there be no second-hand market
value for certain items, fair or reasonable value would then become
the criterion."'
In Beck v. Giordano,'2 the trial court's judgment cancelled de-
fendant's lease of a restaurant. The lease was for a period of five
years and contained an option for five one year renewals at the
same rental. After entering into the lease, the defendant expended
substantial sums of money in remodeling the premises and there-
after operated a restaurant at the premises for five years. During
the fifth year, defendant permitted her son to operate a fire works
stand on the premises for a period of twenty days, over the objec-
8 This case approves the holding in Stiles v. McClellan, 6 Colo. 89, 90, 22 Poc. 460, 461 (1881),
where it is said. .. . [T]here is an important qualification to that rule [that a promise is a good
consideration for a promise], which is, that there must be an absolute mutuality of engagement, so
that each party may have an action on it, or neither will be bound."
9 351 P.2d 872 (Colo. 1960).
10 Id. at 873.
11 Skinner v. Davidson, 351 P.2d 872, 878 (Colo. 1960), citing 6 Corbin, Contracts § 1362 (Rev.
ed. 1960) which deals with a contract for sale of goods with a price to be fixed by appraisal. If it
becomes impossible after performance by the seller to determine price in a manner contemplated "the
buyer will have to pay the reasonable value of what he had received and retained."
12 356 P.2d 264 (Colo. 1960).
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tion of the landlords. The landlords then sued to terminate the
lease claiming, among other things, the breach of the agreement to
occupy the premises as a restaurant. There were no words of limi-
tation of use in the lease. In reversing the trial court, the court
held that the provision authorizing use of the premises for a speci-
fied purpose is generally regarded as permissive, rather than re-
strictive, and does not limit the use of the premises by the lessee to
such purpose nor impliedly forbid its use for a similar lawful pur-
pose which is not injurious to the landlor.':; rights or not otherwise
forbidden. To hold otherwise, in this case, would work a forfeiture.
Provisions for forfeiture are strictly construed against the person
asserting them. The court specifically found that although the de-
fendant's act was willful, it was not, ipso facto, a violation of the
terms of the lease because it was not specifically prohibited and
was not a substantial reason for terminating the lease especially
since no additional fire hazard was created, no other tenants were
molested, and no insurance was cancelled because of defendant's
act.
Fruhling v. E1lis13 involves a contract for purchase of real prop-
erty which states ". . . time shall be of the essence of this agree-
ment and in case of failure . . . to make any of the payments ... to
be made or performed by them [the buyers], this agreement may
be forfeited ... at the option of [sellers] by giving ... fifteen days
notice in writing of their intention so to do, in which event it is
agreed that all payments made hereunder shall be kept and re-
tained by [sellers] as liquidated damages .... ,,14 The contract did
not state when possession was to be delivered and was silent as to
procedures to be followed in the event title was to be found un-
merchantable. Two weeks after entering into the contract, plain-
tiff's attorney rendered an opinion and delivered a copy of it to de-
fendant's counsel stating numerous objections to title. There fol-
lowed a course of dealing between parties leading to the correction
of the title in accordance with the demands of plaintiff. Defendant
did not acquiesce in the contention thattitle was unmerchantable
but did, nevertheless, endeavor to comply with the various de-
mands. Three and a half months after the notice of the alleged de-
fects, and following extensive efforts to comply with the require-
ments of plaintiff, plaintiff stated "I am through arguing, I won't
have anything to do with it." Thereafter, plaintiff was notified by
defendant's counse] that the defendant had elected to terminate the
contract and to retain the $3,500 deposit as a forfeiture unless
plaintiff completed the purchase within fifteen days. The evidence
showed that the defendants had acted diligently to comply with
plaintiff's title requirement. A judgment against plaintiff on the
action to recover the deposit was affirmed, the court stating that
since no definite time is fixed by the contract for tendering an
abstract, merchantable title, curing defects, etc., the vendor shall
have a reasonable time for so doing, and the fact that the contract
provides that "time shall be of the essence of this agreement" adds
nothing to an agreement which fixes no time for the doing of an act.
la 352 P.2d 656 (Colo. 1960).




Plaintiffs, in Marlatt v. LaGrange,15 sued to recover a $2,000
deposit on an option contract for sale and purchase of residence
property which provided that the total price of $18,500 was to be
paid as follows: "$2,000 in cash .. .; obtain maximum loan and bal-
ance to be carried on second deed of trust by seller, on or before
three years." 16 Parol testimony was admitted to show that the par-
ties expected the property to carry a $14,000-14,750 maximum loan,
and on that basis the agreement was entered into. Such a loan was
not obtainable. After an extension of the closing date, the sellers
notified the buyers that they were declaring a forfeiture of the
$2,000 down payment as liquidated damages under terms of the
agreement. Judgment in favor of the plaintiffs for return of the
$2,000 deposit was affirmed. The court held that the words "obtain
maximum loan" being vague and indefinite and not explained in
the writing could be explained by parol evidence and when so ex-
plained clearly stated a condition precedent to the obligation of
plaintiffs to complete the transaction. The condition precedent not
having occurred, plaintiffs were not bound by the option and their
deposit must be refunded.
The vendees in Morley v. Gieseker,I under what appears to be
similar to the local bar association-approved form of receipt and
option, delivered a copy of their attorney's title opinion to the ven-
dor showing title not to be marketable, and demanded return of
their earnest money. This demand was refused. The vendees then
commenced action to recover the earnest money and deposited the
abstract in court. The applicable contract provision was ". . . if title
is not merchantable and written notice of defects is given to the
seller or agent within the time herein provided for delivery of deed
[February 1, 1956] and shall not be rendered merchantable within
thirty days after such written notice . . ." the purchasers shall be
entitled to return of their down payment upon return of the abs-
tract to the seller. The title opinion objecting to title as being Un-
merchantable was dated January 7, 1956. A decree quieting title
was entered February 8, 1956, counsel for plaintiffs refusing to ac-
cept the title as merchantable for the reason that the decree was
rendered against third parties, who may have an interest in the
land, upon whom constructive service of process, only, was had.
Such defendants had six months from the entry of the decree to
move that the decree be set aside."' The trial court entered sum-
mary judgment in favor of plaintiffs. This judgment was affirmed.
The general rule is stated to be that a quiet title decree does not
convert a defective title into a good or merchantable title until the
judgment becomes impervious to attack. Re-delivery of the abstract
was held not to be a condition precedent to the institution of the
action but was only an incident to the right to return of the deposit.
Plaintiff, in Chisholm v. Reitler,19 -is assignor of an optionee
who had paid down fifty per cent on the purchase of an unimproved
lot and sues to recover the fifty per cent deposited. The contract
15 357 P.2d 927 (Colo. 1960).
16 Ibid.
17 351 P.2d 392 (Colo. 1960).
18 Id. at 393.
19 352 P.2d 794 (Colo. 1960).
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provided for delivery of a general warranty deed on April 29, 1957,
and that a title policy would be furnished on or before date of clos-
ing. There was a blanket title policy available on the subdivision
but no separate policy had been ordered on the particular lot. The
purchaser had exhibited an unwillingness to close and the contract
had been extended at the purchaser's request. The vendor-defend-
ant finally wrote the purchaser stating that unless payment were
tendered within ten days, the agreement would be cancelled and
the down payment forfeited. Thereafter, purchaser demanded re-
turn of the down payment and assigned his rights to plaintiff to
commence the present action. No appearance was made in the ap-
peal by the defendant-in-error. This contract, as the contract in the
Fruhling case,20 provided that time was of the essence. The failure
of the purchaser to tender the balance of the purchase price excused
the defendant from being required to tender the title policy. These
two performances were concurrently conditional. There never hav-
ing been a closing, due to the purchaser's unwillingness to close,
the defendant was never in default in tendering the policy.
21
Wagner v. Phoenix Ins. Co. 2 2 is an action on a fire insurance
policy which provided that if the insured and the company failed
to agree on the actual cash value of the loss, each would appoint an
appraiser and the two appraisers would appoint an umpire with the
decision of any two being binding as to the actual cash value and
loss. The policy also provided that there could be no suit or action
on the policy ". . . unless all the requirements of the policy shall
have been complied with, and unless commenced within twelve
months next after inception of the loss. ' 23 Following a loss covered
by the policy, plaintiff appointed an appraiser, defendant appointed
an appraiser, and an umpire was .appointed by the two appraisers.
Plaintiff was dissatisfied with the amount found due under the ap-
praisal clause and brought an action upon the policy contending
that appraisal was a condition precedent to right to sue upon the
policy. In affirming a judgment limiting recovery to an amount
found due under the appraisal, the court held that the appraisal
clause was not a condition precedent to the right to bring action
upon the policy. Because plaintiffs elected to follow the appraisal
procedure, they are bound by the results thereof. Plaintiffs could
have brought action on the policy at the outset without having re-
sorted to the appraisal. Having exercised their option to determine
the question of loss by appraisal, they are irrevocably bound by the
amount of loss so determined.
In the case of Koscove v. Brunger,2 4 plaintiffs sought to rescind
a contract for purchase of certain furniture, fixtures and equipment
on which they had made a $1,500 down payment. Defendant coun-
terclaimed for the balance due. After making the down payment
and removing certain inconsequential items from the premises
where the furniture and fixtures had been stored, the vendor's land-
lord padlocked the storeroom and asserted a lien on the remaining
20 Supro, note 13.
21 Plaintiff asserted that to forfeit one-half of the purchase price constituted o penalty, but he
failed to produce evidence which would substantiate the contention that the liquidated damages in
this instance amounted to a penalty. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.
22 348 P.2d 150 (Colo. 1960).
23 Id. at 151.
24 352 P.2d 961 (Colo. 1960).
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furniture and fixtures. The vendee had no knowledge of the pre-
vious dispute between the vendor and the landlord. For this breach
of an implied warranty of title, the vendee asserted a right to res-
cind. This evidence was held to be sufficient to base rescission upon
breach of the implied warranty of title. The court held that where
a seller of chattels is guilty of a breach of an implied warranty of
title, and the purchaser, relying upon such warranty, had sold or
disposed of a minor portion of the chattels, such purchaser may,
upon learning of the defect of title, elect to rescind the entire trans-
action. This result is in accordance with the applicable provisions
of the Uniform Sales Act.2 5 In the instant case, the deterioration
or injury, by disposing of the inconsequential items, was in good
faith and due to the breach of warranty and, therefore, did not pre-
vent the buyer from returning or offering to return the other goods
to seller and rescinding this sale.
Marzec brought action for damages in Marzec v. Fremont
County School Dist. No. 2-6 alleging that his contract as a public
school teacher was wrongfully terminated by defendant-district. He
showed that he had been employed by the district from December,
1951 to August 31, 1952, and thereafter for three successive periods
commencing September 1st and ending the immediate August 31st
following. The applicable statute 2 7 grants stable and continuous
tenure to a teacher who has served "... on a regular full time basis
25 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 121-1-13 (1953), which deals with implied warranties of title; and Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 121-1-69 (1953), which provides for rescission upon breach of warranty with certain limitations
stated.
26 349 P.2d 699 (Colo. 1960).
27 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 123-18-3 (1953),
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continuously and without interruption for three full years, who
shall thereafter ... be re-employed for the fourth year immediately
succeeding . . . ." In approving dismissal of the complaint on mo-
tion, the court stated that since the teacher tenure law is in derroga-
tion of the common law principle, under which an employer would
be at liberty to hire and fire at will, it must be construed in favor
of the board. Therefore, the work "year" must be strictly construed
as a calendar year and at no time was plaintiff re-employed after
three full calendar years for a fourth year. If he had been so re-
employed, he would have been entitled to tenure.
IV. DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
Plaintiff instituted action in Redak v. Leigh28 on a promissory
note, seeking the principal amount of $1,500 plus interest and at-
torney's fees. The defendant tendered his answer and deposited
$1,550 in the registry of the district court with a prayer that the
court determine what portion of the amount deposited was due the
plaintiff and how much should be returned to the defendant. The
trial court found that the matter of attorney's fees provided for in
the promissory note was not a "justiciable controversy." The deci-
sion was reversed with regard to the denial of attorney's fees with
an order that judgment be entered for the plaintiff in the amount
of attorney's fees due for institution and prosecution of suit in the
trial court only. The court held that the defendant's denial of lia-
bility for, and his refusal to pay, an attorney's fee along with the
admitted balance due on the note, did present a justiciable contro-
versy. In such instances the trial court must determine whether
the plaintiff had either obligated himself to pay, or had actually
paid, attorneys fees, and the reasonableness of the amount.
The Aabergs had apparently bilked plaintiffs in Aaberg v. Har-
man29 of $143,000 by making material misrepresentations concern-
ing a mining venture. Upon learninq of the falsity of the represen-
tations_ plaintiffs served a "notice of rescission and offer of restora-
tion" on the Aabergs and delivered to the Aabergs everything plain-
tiffs had received in the nature of percentage interests in certain
mining claims and other holdings and certificates and so-called
trusts. Thereupon, plaintiffs instituted action to recover the amount
paid under the contract. Judgment was rendered in their favor for
$143,000, plus exemplary damages of $46,804 and body judgment. 30
The court describes plaintiff's relief as recission, seeking return of
money paid as in an action in assumpsit for money had and re-
ceived. • ' Since the present action was not one for damages, exem-
plary damages could not be recovered under the sfatute 2 The
plaintiff's right of action grew out of a tort, or can be said to be
founded upon tort, and in such instance a body execution may issue
regardless of the form of action, be it tort for damages or in as-
sumpsit for money had and received. Accordingly, the judgment
was affirmed as to the $143,000, plus interest, and the body judg-
9 354 P.2d 1016 (Colo. 1960).
29 358 P.2d 601 (Colo. 1960).
30 See Gilbraltar Colorado Life Co. v. Brink, 113 Colo. 304, 306, 157 P.2d 134 (1945); Jessey v.
Butterfield, 61 Colo. 256, 259, 157 Pac. 1, 2 (1916).
31 Wheeler v. Wilkin, 98 Colo. 568, 570, 58 P.2d 1223, 1224 (1936).
32 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 41-2-2 (1953).
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ment, but was modified with directions to vacate the judgment for
exemplary damages.
A judgment in favor of plaintiff on a jury verdict in Fleming v.
Scott 33 was reversed as being excessive and the cause remanded
for a new trial. The defendant agreed to remodel plaintiff's home
and, among other things, to install two floor furnaces. The furnaces
appeared to be defective in either operation or installation and
after four years the plaintiff installed a forced air heating system
requiring extensive work not covered by the contract. From the
amount of the verdict, it appears that the jury had relied heavily
upon the cost of installing the forced air system. The proper rule
of damages in situations of this kind is that the owner is entitled
to the cost of replacement of effectively operating floor furnaces, if
such are available, or a return of that portion of the contract price
represented by the cost of the floor furnace installation, having
due consideration for depreciation of the equipment by use. The
owner, however, cannot charge the contractor for more and differ-
ent kinds of material than that embraced in the contract.
3 4
The first claim in Landauer v. Huey3' alleged a breach of con-
tract by the assignee of an oil and gas lease. The assignee uncondi-
tionally promised to drill a well within sixty days from completion
of a commercial producer in consideration for the assignment. The
evidence showed that two commercially producing wells had been
drilled on the assigned acreage. It is undisputed that the defendant-
assignee failed to commence drilling a third well within sixty days
of completion of the second well. The trial court awarded $33,000
damages for defendant-assignee's failure to drill the third well.
This sum was equal to the reasonable cost of drilling the well. The
defendants contended that the amount of damages should be limit-
ed to the expected loss of royalty from failure to drill the third
well. In rejecting this standard, the court approved damages meas-
ured by "cost of the well" in cases where the breach is of an un-
conditional promise to drill a specific well (such well being a pri-
mary object of the contract) and the cost of the well appears to be
the most logical standard by which the extent of the loss of the
promisee can be measured.3 6
In Horton v. Hedberg,3 suit was instituted upon a promissory
note given by defendants in lieu of cash or earnest money under a
receipt and option, which provided that if any payment or condi-
tion is not made, tendered or performed by the purchasers, then the
contract is void and of no effect and both parties are released from
obligation thereunder, provided, however, that the payments made
thereon are to be retained as liquidated damages. The judgment of
the trial court dismissing plaintiff's complaint was reversed with
order to enter findings on issues presented by the pleadings and
33 348 P.2d 701 (Colo. 1960).
14 Restatement, Contracts § 329 comment (a) (1932).
35 352 P.2d 302 (Colo. 1960).
36 The case also approved a definition of a commercial producer as a well that will return a
profit over operating expenses, rejecting any definition based upon whether the well will return a
profit after recovery of all drilling expenses.
37 351 P.2d 843 (Colo. 1960).
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evidence or for a new trial. The court held that the promissory
note became an absolute obligation at the time of the signing of
the option agreement by the vendor and the vendee. Accordingly,
the amount due under the note was subject to forfeiture to the
same extent that a cash deposit would have been.
The case of Von Riesen v. Greeley Finance Co. 3 1 involved a
third party creditor beneficiary relationship. A and B were joint
debtors to the plaintiff finance company. B and third party defend-
ant Von Riesen, for valuable consideration, entered into a contract,
partly proven by a memorandum and partly by parol evidence,
under which Von Riesen agreed to settle B's obligation to plaintiff.
The court approved interest, as damages, at the rate of two per
cent per month under an applicable statute39 from the date of de-
fault on the note to the date of filing the complaint. Von Riesen
was held to be liable for the entire debt and not just one-half of it
since B, under the terms of the joint obligation to the plaintiff, was
obligated to pay, and was sued for, the entire debt and not only
one-half thereof.
V. OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE
Union Interchange, Inc. v. Sierota40 illustrates the rule that
time, place or manner of acceptance of an offer must be in compli-
ance with requirements specified in the offer.41 The defendant
signed a contract form providing for his payment of $150 for certain
advertisements regarding sale of defendant's business. The con-
tract stated, ". . . this agreement shall become effective only when
accepted by your office in Los Angeles, California. You shall notify
me of such acceptance. '42 Plaintiff failed to show the specified ap-
proval and notice of acceptance of the defendant's offer. Judgment
in favor of the defendant was affirmed.
A trial court judgment in favor of a stockbroker-plaintiff was
reversed on evidence in Baldwin v. Peters, Writer & Christensen
43
showing that the defendants ordered the plaintiff-stockbroker to
purchase specified stock at 2c per share, but the broker purchased
at 2 1/8c per share. The defendants refused to pay for the stock.
The broker later sold the stock for an undisclosed price. No en-
forceable contract was made. The defendants' offer was rejected
when the broker purchased stock at an unauthorized price.
44
The case of Howard v. White4;, emphasizes the importance of
correctly stating the identity of contracting parties. Here, the de-
fendant, Howard, received $20,640 from the plaintiff, in connection
with a dance contract form, signed "ARTHUR MURRAY, INC., By,
Authorized Signature." The evidence conclusively showed that
Howard had no authority to sign for Arthur Murray. Inc., and the
action was dismissed as to Arthur Murray, Inc. The trial court
found ". . . there never was a contract between the plaintiff, Myr-
tle K. White, and the.... defendant .... Budd Howard, individually
'38 350 P.2d 340 (Colo. 1960)
39 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 73-3-5 (1953).
40 355 P.2d 1089 (Colo. 1960).
41 Restatement, Contracts § 61 (1932).
42 355 P.2d 1089, 1090 (Colo. 1960).
43 349 P.2d 146 (Colo. 1960).
44 Nucla Sanitation Dist. v. Rippy, 344 P.2d 976 (Colo. 1960); 1 Williston, Contracts 4 51 (3rd
ed. 1957).
45 356 P.2d 484 (Colo. 1960).
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and doing business as the Arthur Murray Studios. There was only
an unsuccessful attempt to execute a contract between plaintiff and
Arthur Murray, Inc.4 6 Howard did not attempt to contract in his
individual capacity. Accordingly, judgment in favor of plaintiff for
the value of the unused lessons, $14,000 plus interest, was affirmed.
In Walden v. Koehler47 the owner-defendant authorized one
Hurd to contract for the installation of a furnace and paid the cost
of the furnace to Hurd. Hurd entered into a contract with plaintiff
in the name of the owner regarding installation of the furnace.
Hurd failed to pay for the furnace and the owner denied liability
claiming he had paid Hurd as an independent contractor. Judg-
ment in favor of the owner was reversed with directions to enter
judgment in favor of plaintiff, the court noting that there was no
evidence to support a finding that Hurd was an independent con-
tractor and on the contrary he was specifically held to be the ser-
vant or agent of the owner, duly authorized to contract for the
furnace on behalf of the owner.
The plaintiff, in Fellows v. Cantrell,48 at a minor's request,
furnished funds for a two year college education. The minor, after
reaching the age of twenty-one not only failed to disaffirm the con-
tract within a reasonable time but five years later expressly ratified
and acknowledged the obligation. Judgment in favor of the defend-
ant was reversed. The case follows the well established rule that
while a contract of a minor is not void, but voidable only at the
election of the minor on arrival at maturity, such election must be
made within a reasonable time after reaching maturity; the failure
to disaffirm within such reasonable time constitutes a ratification.
In Gray v. Quiller,49 Quiller and Hunt were tenants-in-common
of two parcels of real property that they leased to Ramstetter with
an option in Ramstetter to buy at a stated price during the term
of the lease. Prior to expiration of the lease, Hunt died and devised
her one-half interest in one property to Quiller and her one-half
interest in the other property to Gray. Thereafter, Ramstetter al-
lowed his option to lapse. Two days after the lease terminated, he
purchased Quiller's interest in both properties for $10,000. Gray ap-
parently tried to secure a judgment for part of this purchase price.
The trial court dismissed Gray's complaint at the close of plaintiff's
46 Id. at 485.
47 349 P.2d 379 (Colo. 1960).
48 352 P.2d 289 (Colo. 1960).
49 355 P.2d 99 (Colo. 1960).
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evidence. This dismissal was affirmed on appeal. The case is of in-
terest only to the extent that it approves the language of an earlier
case stating "A contract of sale creates mutual obligations on the
part of the seller to sell and on the part of the purchaser to buy,
while an option gives the right to purchase, within a limited time,
without imposing any obligations to purchase. °5 0 Ramstetter could
refuse to buy under the option and was free to deal with Quiller as
to Quiller's separately owned interests in the property.
The case of Witherspoon v. Pusch51 exemplifies the established
rule that paroi evidence may be used to show that a writing was
neither executed nor delivered as a final contract, but was to be-
come effective only at some future day or on the happening of
some contingency. 5 Here, the offeror signed and delivered a writ-
ten offer to purchase real property to the agent of the vendor. As
a convenience to the agent, a check for the deposit was also deliv-
ered. The vendor and agent sued, unsuccessfully, on the check and
contract. The offeror was permitted, over objection, to testify that
the offer to purchase was not a firm offer and that the check for
the down payment was to be held until the offeror had an oppor-
tunity to investigate zoning restrictions and the adaptability of the
.property to intended uses. The trial court's ruling, permitting the
introduction of this evidence, was approved on appeal.
Parol evidence was rejected in King Collection Bureau v.
Bruns53 where such evidence would vary the plain terms of a writ-
ten agreement. The plaintiff was the assignee of the original holder
of a note executed by Bruns, which note contained an ambiguous
provision that it could be repaid by ". . . return of the participating
production certificates and common stock, .. .,54 but did not iden-
tify such items. The defendants, by their answer, specifically de-
scribed the participating certificates and stock and deposited the
same in the registry of the court for the purpose of discharging the
note. Plaintiff's reply admitted the identity of the certificates and
stock. Summary judgment was rendered in favor of the defendants
and affirmed. The plaintiff was not permitted to show by parol evi-
dence that defendants' right to discharge the note by redelivery of
the certificates and stock was conditioned upon certain unstated
events. The issue of such conditionality, attempted to be raised in
plaintiff's reply, would have varied or contradicted the plain terms
of the written instrument, as explained by the pleadings, in viola-
tion of the parol evidence rule.
Plaintiffs brought action for specific performance of contract
to convey real property and for other relief in Coulter v. Ander-
son.55 Defendants counterclaimed for damages and denied the ex-
istence of a contract. The evidence showed that the Andersons and
Coulters entered into a written contract regarding the purchase and
sale of the Coulters' ranch. There were a great many details that
were not included in the primary contract. Andersons entered into
possession and operated the ranch and tendered a supplementary
50 Stelson v. Haigler, 63 Colo. 200, 208, 165 Poc. 265, 268 (1917).
51 349 P.2d 137 (Colo. 1960). *
52 3 Williston, Contracts § 634 (Rev. ed. 1936).
53 354 P.2d 609 (Colo. 1960).
54 Ibid.
55 357 P.2d 76 (Colo. 1960).
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contract covering all but one of the additional demands of the
Coulters.56 In affirming a decree granting specific performance in
favor of the Andersons, the court held that the supplemental agree-
ment as to the omitted matters was not intended by the parties to
be a condition to the formation of the primary contract and it was
not intended that there be a fully integrated contract embodying
the omitted matters. 57 It was further held that specific performance
is not to be limited to fact situations in which a complete agree-
ment has been reduced to writing, especially where it is shown that
a writing is not intended to be fully integrated and the omitted
items can be proven by parol. Accordingly, the statute of frauds5
is not applicable since the parties did not intend to postpone a legal
meeting of the minds until the additional matters were reduced to
writing.
VI. FRAUD, ESTOPPEL, UNDUE INFLUENCE, MISTAKE
The decision in Atkinson v. Englewood State Bank59 has been
long needed in order to provide a standard which might protect the
public against the vicious tactics often used in certain fields of spe-
cialty selling today. The payee of a negotiable instrument brought
action against the maker. The defendant-maker alleged that he had
been induced to sign a contract for purchase of a rug and to sign a
so-called "contract" in blank which was in fact a cognovit note, the
note on which payee sued. The trial court entered judgment in
favor of the payee and refused to submit the defendant's defense
of fraud in the inducement to the jury. In reversing the trial court,
Justice Doyle states that the evidence submitted by the defendant
was sufficient in quality and quantity to establish fraud in the in-
ducement thereby requiring the payee to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that it was in fact a holder in due course.60 The
evidence which constituted fraud in the inducement consisted of
one Palmer's having exhibited a high quality sample of carpeting
to the defendant, representing to the defendant that Palmer would
pay $50 for the privilege of photographing the installed carpeting
in the defendant's home, and $25 for each lead furnished by the de-
fendant to whom Palmer was able to make a sale of carpeting,
thereby implying that defendant and Palmer were almost partners.
In addition, the contract contained a misleading heading. The court
rejected a contention that there had been fraud in the procurement
inasmuch as the defendant-maker knew that his signature created
a ]eval obligation and he was duty bound to read the instrument
which he signed in blank. His failure to do so was negligence in
law. In determining that the plaintiff was not a holder in due
course, the court pointed to the fact that the plaintiff-bank merely
credited Palmer's account with the proceeds of the note, without
more, and did not show that Palmer was allowed to draw checks
against the credit thus extended. The opinion states that the ma-
56 The matters omitted from the written agreement included a chattel mortgage on Personalty as
security, an agreement to except a twenty acre tract from the primary contract, the location of a
cabin site reserved by the Coulters, the terms and conditions for use of utilities, the riahts of ingress
and egress, the furnishinn of doiry products and pasturage rights, and the fishing and boat storage
rights to be extended by the Andersons to the Coulters.
57 Accord. 165 A.L.R. 756 (1946); 122 A.L.R. 1219 (1939). See also Restatement, Contracts § 33
(1932); 12 Am. Jur., Contracts 1 235 (1938).
58 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 59-1-8 (1953).
59 348 P.2d 702 (Colo. 1960).
60 Britton, Bills & Notes §1 125 and 130 (1943) (fraud as a defense).
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jority view in the United States is that a bank does not become a
holder for value merely by giving credit."1 If the plaintiff had sus-
tained the burden of proving that it was a holder in due course, the
defense of fraud in the inducement would not have been available
to the defendant. The court was not required to determine whether
such a payee as the bank could ever be a holder in due course un-
der these circumstances evidencing a course of dealings between
the specialty salesman and the payee-bank.
An action, based on undue influence, was brought in Benway
v. National State Bank6 2 against the conservator of the estate of
Benway's grandmother and against Benway's father, Elmer, to
rescind deeds conveying plaintiff's interest in certain properties to
her grandmother, a mental incompetent, and the latter's subsequent
deeding of the properties to Elmer. Evidence was introduced show-
ing that when Benway was about to marry, being then of the age
of 38 years, her marriage was opposed by the grandmother and El-
mer. Two days before her wedding, at the grandmother's insist-
ence, plaintiff signed a deed to one of the properties before the
grandmother's attorney. The attorney testified that plaintiff was
in a very depressed condition, tearful and emotional. After the
marriage, Benway, while in an emotional and distraught state,
signed the second deed regarding the other property before the
same attorney for the purpose of trying to make her grandmother
happy and to help preserve her marriage. About two years later,
Elmer was successful in getting the grandmother, then 86 years of
age, in poor health, and with failing hearing, impaired eye sight
and high blood pressure, to execute a deed to him regarding both
properties. Elmer and the grandmother had long been at odds
with each other. A physician testified that, in his opinion, the
grandmother was a mental incompetent when she signed the deeds
to Elmer, and that two years afterwards she was so adjudicated.
The trial court quieted Benway's title as a joint tenant in one prop-
erty and ordered reconveyance of the other property to restore all
titles to the status that existed prior to Benway's first conveyance.
On appeal, the court held that there was ample competent evidence
of undue influence to sustain the finding and decree of the trial
court.
63
Action was brought in Handy v. Rogers64 on a purchase money
note and mortgage given by defendants to plaintiff-vendor in part
payment of a hotel. Judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff in
an amount in excess of $40,000 including interest, attorneys fees
and amounts advanced for insurance. The original sales price had
been $40,000 of which $6,000 was paid down and defendants had
paid $4,400 for improvements before vacating the property. In af-
firming the judgment for plaintiff, the court noted that there was
ample evidence of misrepresentation concerning the earnings of
the hotel property. The misrepresentations, however, were held
not to be material since they related to a period of time more than
61 Id. § 167.
62 357 P.2d 912 (Colo. 1960).
63 For an excellent discussion of the elements required in efforts to set aside a transaction based
upon undue influence see Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency and the Major Premise, 53 Yale L. J.
271 (1943-44).
64 351 P.2d 819 (Colo. 1960).
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three years prior to the sale, and defendants had not justifiably re-
lied upon these representations. There was also ample evidence
that the defendants did not seasonably rescind, whereas it is incum-
bent upon a defrauded party to promptly and unequivocally give
notice of election to avoid the contract.65 The judgment was modi-
fied for other reasons.66
In Simon v. Lloyd,67 the judgment of the trial court in award-
ing damages to plaintiff for breach of warranty on sale of baled
hay was affirmed. The trial court found that defendant had repre-
sented the hay to be "very good quality wire-tied baled alfalfa hay"
and that the hay was of "good quality." The trial court found on
disputed evidence that the hay was not of good quality on the date
of sale, and that plaintiff relied on the oral representations as to
quality.
The judgment creditors of an automobile liability policy holder
and the policy holder sued the insurance company in Safeco Ins. Co.
of America v. Gonacha 8 upon a liability policy issued to the judg-
ment debtor. The company defended on the grounds that the in-
sured, in his application for insurance, falsely stated the following:
(a) That no insurer cancelled or refused him insurance; (b) That
he had not been convicted or forfeited bail for traffic violation dur-
ing the past three years; and (c) That he had not been involved
in an accident within the past three years. Eight days after the ac-
cident on which the judgment creditors had previously sued the in-
sured, the company gave notice of cancellation and tendered back
the premium, which was refused. At the conclusion of all the evi-
dence, a verdict was directed in favor of the plaintiffs. The judg-
ment entered on this verdict was reversed in favor of the insurance
company. The false representations were not attached to the policy
as issued. The court held that representations, as distinguished
from warranties, need not be attached to the contract in order for
the insurer to rely upon the same. The representations being false
and material to the risk, and the insurance company having relied
thereon in entering into the contract, the necessary grounds to void
the policy were met.6 9 Another case reached the same result. 70
Dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint in Drake v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co.7' was affirmed. Plaintiffs sued upon defendant's
binder to issue an automobile liability and medical payment policy
to plaintiffs. The binder had been issued on one of plaintiffs' written
representations that no insurer had cancelled or refused to issue or
renew plaintiffs' automobile insurance within three years. This rep-
65 Accord, Restatement, Contracts § 480 (1932), cited with approval, id. at 823.
66 Having entered judgment, the trial court then ordered the sheriff to sell the property which
was secured by a deed of trust at a special execution sale after 30 days publication of the notice of
sale. Although a deed of trust may be foreclosed under court order, the outcome of this sale was
that the plaintiff repurchased the property for $1,000, leaving unsatisfied a judgment still exceeding
$40,000. To correct this inequitable situation, the Supreme Court ordered that the sheriff's sale be
set aside and that a new soe be held with the trial court supervising the same and requiring a
return and report of sale and approval thereof by the trial court. The final direction to the trial court
directed that "the trial judge should disapprove any sale at a price which bears no relationship to
the actual value of the property."
67 350 P.2d 823 (Colo. 1960).
68 350 P.2d 189 (Colo. 1960).
69 Inasmuch as this policy was a "voluntary" oalicy as distinguished from an assigned risk or
involuntary policy under the Colorado Financial Responsibility Law, the insurance ccrrier did not
become absolutely bound under statute upon the occurrence of the accident July 8, 1955.




resentation was false. Following the rule of the Safeco case,72 the
court held that misrepresentations made by the applicant in the ap-
plication for automobile insurance voided the policy and no recov-
ery therefore could be had upon the policy or the binder.
The judgments of the trial court on two suits in rescission of
vendor-purchaser contracts rescinding the contract of one and
awarding damages regarding the other were affirmed in Cohen v.
Vivian.73 The respective purchasers had signed contracts to pur-
chase adjacent duplexes in the early stages of construction. The
contracts stated that the purchasers relied upon inspection and not
upon representations of any person. The vendors learned during
excavation of the premises that the land was filled soil and re-
quired alteration in the plans for foundations of the duplexes.
Shortly after the purchasers occupied the premises, the respective
houses sank, tilted and cracked to such an extent that one had to be
vacated and the other required substantial expenditures to render
it safe for habitation. These defects resulted directly from the un-
stable soil condition. The court held that the defective soil condi-
tion was a latent defect from the standpoint of the purchasers but
equivalent to a patent defect from the standpoint of the vendors in
view of their prior discovery that it was filled ground. "A latent
soil defect, known to the seller of a house built on such soil, creates
a duty of disclosure in the seller. His failure to disclose amounts
to concealment, making him vulnerable to a suit based upon
fraud. '74 The doctrine of caveat emptor cannot be a shield in such
case. Since the purchaser's inspection did not disclose the defect,
the vendor was required to disclose it, and this duty to disclose is
not eliminated by the contract provision regarding inspection by
the vendees.
In McKinney v. Christmas,75 Christmas was an agent in the
sale of plaintiff's property under an installment type contract.
Christmas' office collected payments on the contract. When the
purchaser defaulted, one of Christmas' employees acquired the in-
terest of the purchaser and subsequently sold the property at a
substantial profit. The acquisition by Christmas' employee and the
sale for profit was not disclosed to plaintiff. Plaintiff brought an
action for an accounting which was dismissed on defendants mo-
tion. The court held that Christmas was a special agent and that
in regard to the matters of his special agency, he was under duty
to exercise the utmost good faith and loyalty and make a full and
complete disclosure of all facts relative to the subject of his agency
which may be material for the principal to know. Where the agent
failed in the performance of these duties and made a profit from
such failure, he must account for the profit to his principal. The
case specifically holds that Christmas stood in a confidential rela-
tionship to the plaintiff and by violation of duties owed to plaintiff
abused this relationship.
The problem of estoppel was raised in Baumgartner v.
Tweedy7 6 in an action for attorney's fees. The defendant alleges
72 Supra, note 68.
73 349 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1960).
74 Id. at 367.
75 353 P.2d 373 (Colo. 1960).
76 354 P.2d 586 (Colo. 1960).
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that the fees, if owed, are the obligation of a limited partnership in
Which defendant claims to be a limited partner. As a further de-
fense defendant alleged that plaintiffs had represented that the
partnership was in fact a limited partnership and were therefore
estopped to claim that defendant was a general partner. The facts
disclose that only a general partnership agreement, prepared by de-
fendant's own personal attorneys, was entered into. In affirming
judgment for plaintiff, the court noted that estoppel only arises
where one, relying upon another's conduct, detrimentally alters his
position. The evidence did not support the defense of estoppel.
Plaintiff, in Waterman v. Perrotta,77 obtained judgment against
defendant for the full amount of the balance due plaintiff on a note
executed by a third party to plaintiff. The third party, after execu-
tion of the note, sold his business to defendant. There was no at-
tempt to comply with the Bulk Sales Law.7 8 Although the total as-
sets received by the defendant from the third party were worth
only $3,320, the defendant had paid $4,008 to his vendors' creditors
before learning of the claim of plaintiff. The vendor in the mean-
time died. The court held that the plaintiff need not prove that his
claim against the third party was for a loan regarding the business
nor for the purchase of any articles that were sold. Nor must plain-
tiff show that his claim was due and payable at the time of the sale
in order to be protected by the act.79 The defendant-purchaser,
however, was held to be liable as a receiver only to the extent of
77 355 P.2d 313 (Colo. 1960).
78 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 18-1-1 to -3 (1953).









the goods and wares that came into his possession under the sale.
Notwithstanding the fact that defendant voluntarily paid other
creditors 100% of their claims, he is only obligated to pay to plain-
tiff that percentage of plaintiff's $1,500 claim that is equal to the
value of the assets received ($3,320) divided by the total debts ow-
ing by the vendor ($4,008). This percentage was sixty per cent and,
therefore, the judgment previously rendered in favor of plaintiff
was modified, reducing it to the proper percentage.
Plaintiff and defendant in Jackson Enterprises, Inc. v. Ma-
guire"0 entered into an agreement under which plaintiff purchased
certain motel property from defendant agreeing to make certain
payments on the purchase price upon the sale of some of plaintiff's
property located in Illinois. When the Illinois sale did not mate-
rialize, a substituted agreement was reached to provide for pay-
ment of the balance due on the motel. In carrying out this agree-
ment, the defendant's agent secured the legal description of prop-
erties owned by plaintiff in Illinois and was specifically advised by
plaintiff, when the descriptions were shown to her, that plaintiff
would not transfer her Illinois home to defendants. Nevertheless,
when the deed was signed and a trust deed on the motel was given
for the unpaid portion of the purchase price, the deed signed by
plaintiff did include a description covering the Illinois home as well
as the other Illinois property. Upon learning that the Illinois home
had been included in the transfers to defendant, plaintiff brought
an action to reform the contract alleging the inclusion of the Illinois
home to have been a mistake recognizable as such by the defend-
ant. In the meantime, defendant had sold the Illinois home. The
trial court found that the evidence sustained plaintiff's contention
that the home should not have been included and gave judgment
against the defendant for the value of the home, such sum to be
applied against the purchase money note and trust deed which
remained unpaid on the motel. The defendant contended that refor-
mation could not be had for unilateral mistake, but only for mu-
tual mistake established beyond a reasonable doubt by clear and
unequivocal evidence. In affirming the trial court's determination,
the court found that the requirement that evidence of mistake be
clear and convincing was satisfied. The court noted that it must
presume the trial court used this standard as to the quantum of
proof. As to the contention that reformation could be had only for
mutual mistake, the court held that one party cannot knowingly
take advantage of the mistake of the other party to the contract. 81
VII. ACCORD EXECUTORY, TERMINATION BY RESERVED POWER,
DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY, COVENANT NOT To SUE
Buick entered into a contract with Royal to drill an oil well
to the "Granite." Drilling operations were terminated when Buick
lost circulation. The parties then entered into a supplemental agree-
ment which provided for a "compromise settlement of the dispute
now existing between the parties" under the terms of which certain
80 355 P.2d 540 (Colo. 1960).
81 In so doing, the court relied upon the Restatement, Contracts § 505 (1932). "Except as stated
in §§ 506, 509-511, if one party at the time of the execution of a written instrument knows not only
that the writing does not accurately express the intention of the other party as to the terms to be
embodied therein, but knows what that intention is, the latter can have the writing reformed so that
it will express that intention."
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monies were paid to Buick and Buick resumed drilling, the supple-
mental agreement making provision for payment of additional serv-
ices. When circulation was again lost, the well was abandoned by
mutual consent and Buick tendered its bill to Royal. Royal asked
for an extension of time in which to pay and executed and deliv-
ered a promissory note in the amount of the billing by Buick. The
court found in Royal Oil & Gas Co. v. Buick Drilling, Inc.82 that
Royal's counterclaim for damages for alleged breaches by Buick
under the original contract was waived and merged in the supple-
mental agreement. It further specifically held that the acknowl-
edgment of the unliquidated and disputed claim by the execution
and tendering of the promissory note constituted an obligation en-
forceable as an account stated or an executory accord.
83
This case, Ace Flying Serv., Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Agricul-
ture,84 appears in an earlier report on a different point.85 Plaintiff-
in-error here seeks reversal of a judgment of dismissal. The con-
tract sued upon provided that "the state . . .may terminate this
contract at any time subject only to the service guarantee herein
specified .... ", The state terminated the contract under the above
power. The service guarantee provided that a specified rental
would be paid for each available aircraft requested by the state
which was ready for immediate operation during times that spray-
ing operations were prevented because of weather conditions, etc.
The specified rental was to be charged against the price of .13750
per acre sprayed and if the payments based upon the acres sprayed
exceeded the rental, no additional rental would be payable. A little
less than twenty-five percent of the total acreage, which was con-
templated to be sprayed, was sprayed prior to termination of the
the consequences of its own improvident act in entering into the
contract, approving a previous holding to the same effect.
8 7
In an action to recover the balance due on a debt evidenced by
a chattel mortgage, the defendant in Castle Canon Co. v. Atwood 8
answered that the debt was discharged in his bankruptcy proceed-
ings. The debt was evidenced by a combined note and chattel mort-
gage naming Gamble Equipment Company payee and contained an
assignment from Gamble to Universal C. I. T. with provision that
"all payments are due at Universal C. I. T.'s office, New York, Chi-
cago or San Francisco . . . ." In bankruptcy schedule A-2, the de-
fendant listed "C. I. T. Corporation, Centennial Building, 210 West
Tenth Street, Kansas City, Missouri" and described the debt. The
court rejected the contention of Universal C. I. T. Corporation's
successor in interest that the debt had not been properly scheduled
since the full name of the assignee was not given and the address
used was different from the general address stated in the instru-
ment. The evidence showed that the debtor had made payments to
R2 348 P.2d 148 (Colo. 1960).
8.3 See Corbin, Contracts, § 1312 (1951).
84 348 P.2d 962 (Colo. 1960).
85 Ace Flying Serv., Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Agriculture, 136 Cola. 19, 314 P.2d 278 (1957).
R6 Supra note 84 at 964.
87 Hanks v. McNeil Coal Corp., 114 Colo. 578, 168 P.2d 256 (1946), "Hence it is a general rule
that if a party enters into a contract or cny other legal transaction with sufficient mental capacity to
understand it, and not under the influence of fraud, coercion or imposition, the courts will not relieve
him of the consequences of his act on the sole ground that the bargain is, as to him, improvident, rash,
foolish or oppressive."
88 351 P.2d 459 (Colo. 1960).
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C. I. T.'s Kansas City office on another obligation which was sched-
uled in the debtor's petition in bankruptcy. On this state of facts,
the court held that the course of dealings between the defendant
and plaintiff's assignor amounted to a waiver of the right of C. I. T.
to insist on the full use of its name or that notice of the bankruptcy
proceeding be sent to one of the general offices listed in the as-
signed mortgage. Consequently, the debt was discharged and the
defense of discharge in bankruptcy was good.
In Carroll v. Stancato89 the trial court's entry of a preliminary
injunction against defendants' employees teaching the accordion
for plaintiff was affirmed. The defendants' contracts of employ-
ment provided that the employees would not compete with the em-
ployer for a period of five years after terminating their employ-
ment. The evidence showed that the employees were not only com-
peting at the termination of their employment, but were using the
employer's studio, his instruments and his telephone number. They
had, in fact, "confiscated their employer's school in toto, complete
with instruments and music." It was pointed out that the determ-
ination on the application for preliminary injunction is not a de-
termination of the merits of the case upon trial.
The case of Hamm v. Thompson ° involves a question of wheth-
er a covenant not to sue given to the employer who is liable under
the doctrine of respondeat superior for the active negligence of its
employee bars a tort action against the employee under the doc-
trine of Price v. BakerY1 This question was answered in the nega-
tive, the reason given being that where the master's liability for the
tort of his servant arises out of a tort in which the servant is the
sole actor and the master's liability is therefore only imputed or
constructive, based on the doctrine of respondeat superior and
nothing else, the liability is joint and several, but the master and
servant are not joint tort-feasors.
VIII. REAL ESTATE BROKERS COMMISSION CLAIM
In Pyles v. Colorado Land & Inv. Co., 92 a judgment in the
amount of five percent of $62,500 in favor of a broker was reversed.
Defendant Pyles owned a liquor store and discussed his willingness
to sell it for a net price of $65,000 with an officer of plaintiff. No
listing was signed. Two and one-half months later, the defendant
sold the store to persons whom the plaintiff, a year later, claims
were his prospects. The evidence showed that defendant was un-
acquainted with any such claim at the time of sale. Judgment was
reversed. The court found that the broker did not comply with the
terms of the "listing," if there were any; the defendant at the time
of sale had no notice of previous negotiations between broker and
purchaser, the broker had not produced a purchaser ready, willing
and able to buy on the terms prescribed by the owner and it did
not appear that plaintiff was the efficient agent or procuring cause
of the sale nor the predominating effective cause of the sale.
In the case of Bradley Realty Inv. Co. ', -zhwartz,9 3 plaintiff
9 354 P.2d 1018 (Colo. 1960).
90 353 P.2d 73 (Colo. 1960).
91 352 P.2d 90 (1959).
92 355 P.2d 953 (Colo. 190.
fig 357 P.2d 638 (Cc!-, '"""
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had an oral non-exclusive listing regarding a portion of defendant's
property. The listing price was $80,000. Plaintiff found a prospec-
tive purchaser for $75,000 cash and testified that defendant said he
would take the deal and for plaintiff to bring him the contract. De-
fendant testified that he told plaintiff to bring the contract so that
defendant could look at it. There was conflicting testimony on the
reason defendant did not accept the contract. The issue posed was
whether plaintiff had procured a buyer ready, willing and able to
purchase on terms stated by defendant. This involved a determina-
tion of whether defendant had agreed to reduce his price to $75,000.
The trial court's order directing a verdict in favor of defendant at
the conclusion of plaintiff's testimony was reversed because a jury
question was posed as to the weight to be given to the evidence and
the credibility of witnesses, there being substantial evidence tend-
ing to establish a cause of action. A second claim in the case was
a claim for commission based on plaintiff's contention that he had
produced a lessee regarding another parcel of defendant's property.
This prospect had been shown one parcel but no lease was ever ar-
ranged. Later, this prospect and the defendant negotiated a lease
on a different parcel than that shown the prospect by plaintiff. Dis-
missal of the claim for commission based on the subsequent lease
was affirmed. The broker had not produced a lessee ready, willing
and able to lease the property on the terms and at the price desig-
nated by the defendant. The broker was not the efficient agent or
procuring cause of the lease.
94
Fistell v. Thomas95 is another action by a real estate broker for
commission. The broker claimed the commission from the vendor in
his first claim and claimed damages against the vendor and the
purchasers based upon a civil conspiracy to prevent the broker from
securing his commission in his second claim. The broker did not
have an exclusive listing and at best had an oral listing. Further,
the owner was advertising the property for sale himself and had
given a listing to others. The only connection between the broker
and the sale was that on inquiry by a person bearing the same name
as one of the purchasers, the broker stated that the property in-
volved was for sale and on inquiry by another of the ultimate pur-
chasers relayed the name of this person to the owner. The broker
94 The same rule is distinctly stated in Heady v. Tomlinson, 134 Colo. 33, 299 P.2d 120 (1956).
95 355 P.2d 105 (Colo. 1960).
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at no time brought the owner and the purchasers together. In ac-
cord with several recent cases,96 the trial court's dismissal of the
complaint and entry of judgment in favor of all defendants at the
conclusion of plaintiff's testimony was affirmed. Since plaintiff was
not entitled to a commission, he was not entitled to claim damages
by reason of conspiracy to prevent him from securing the commis-
sion, if such conspiracy ever existed. This follows from the rule
stated in an earlier case 97 holding that "recovery of damages in the
civil action for conspiracy, except in situations not here applicable,
is not based on the conspiracy itself, but on damages resulting from
an overt act or acts of one or more of defendants, resulting from
the conspiracy. . . ." It is believed that an action for wrongful in-
terference with expectation of contract could be maintained against
a conniving buyer in an appropriate case.
In Credit Inv. & Loan Co. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 98 the
plaintiff brought action against the bank and its president for an
alleged breach of contract. The contract provided that the bank
would purchase the plaintiff's negotiable paper upon certain terms
with recourse to plaintiff. The contract had the typical provision
for the establishment of a reserve account to which might be
charged such paper as the plaintiff was required to accept under
the recourse provision. Plaintiff contended that the bank breached
the contract by exercising control of collection of the paper involved
and that plaintiff was entitled to be paid the amount of the reserve
account as well as damages on a second claim for failure of the
bank to accept additional paper. The bank's president was sued
personally on the theory of wrongful interference with contract re-
lations by inducing the bank to breach the contract with plaintiff.
A motion for summary judgment in favor of the bank was granted.
This judgment was reversed and remanded with directions that the
trial court enter an order that the defendants answer or otherwise
plead to the second amended complaint.
The defense of res adjudicata was raised and rejected in two
contract cases. It was held in Hizel v. Howard99 that a judgment of
dismissal of a dance student's previous action100 to rescind a con-
tract entered into with her instructors (the previous action having
affirmed the existence of a valid contract between the parties) is
not res adjudicata as to the student's subsequent action for breach
of the same contract. There were subsequent breaches arising out
of the instructor's having advised the student that the cost of the
previous litigation would be set off against the value of the lessons
remaining under the contract and that no lessons remained due.
The court specifically points out that it is to be presumed that par-
ties will act in accordance with their legal obligations and it is not
to be said that when contractual obligations of the parties had been
confirmed as a result of the previous suit there would be a breach
by repudiating the existence of the contract.
In Benson v. Bottger,1° 1 the Bottgers entered into an agreement
96 Carpenter v. Francis, 136 Colo. 494, 319 P.2d 497 (1957); Johns v. Ambrose, Williams & Co.,
136 Colo. 390, 317 P.2d 897 (1957).
q7 Lockwood Grader Corp. v. Bochaus, 129 Colo. 339, 270 P.2d 193 (1954).
98 353 P.2d 1098 (Colo. 1960).
99 354 P.2d 611 (Colo. 1960).
100 Collins v. Howard, 130 Colo. 272, 274 P.2d 977 (1954).
101 354 P.2d 601 (Colo. 1960).
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to trade certain property for a resort owned by the Gehrleins. The
Bottgers believed that the resort was under a five year lease with
an annual rental of $3,000 per year. After the trade was consum-
mated, the lessees, Bensons, claimed that the rent for the full five
year term was $3,000 and referred Bottgers to a copy of the lease
the Bensons had recorded. The recorded lease had been altered
by the Bensons in that a rider providing for the annual rental of
$3,000, in place of $3,000 for the five year term, had been removed
from the lease prior to recording. The Bottgers then brought action-
against the Gehrleins claiming material misrepresentation and
praying for rescission. The Gehrleins filed a third party complaint
against the Bensons alleging fraud and deceit in altering the lease
prior to its recording. Bottger's action against the Gehrleins was
dismissed with prejudice following both the Bottgers and the Ben-
sons executing a release to the Gehrleins, and the Gehrleins execut-
ing releases to the Bottgers and the Bensons. The Bottgers did not
release the Bensons. The Bensons' motion to dismiss the Gehrleins'
third party complaint was never ruled upon. Thereafter, the Bott-
gers sued the Bensons for three years rental at $3,000 per year. The
Bensons appealed from an adverse judgment claiming that the dis-
missal of the previous action was a bar to the present action under
the doctrine of res adjudicata. In affirming the judgment of the
trial court, it was pointed out that there were four elements which
must be shown if a defendant is to avail himself of the plea of res
adjudicata.
10 2
It is to be noted that the present action, unlike previous actions
before the court, does not involve identity of parties. The Bottgers
and the Bensons were not "opposing parties" in the original action.
Even under past decisions, the Bensons defense would fail.1113 Such
decisions do not bar a second proceeding based upon a different
claim from that litigated and determined in the first action. The
Bensons were not previously sued by the Bottgers, they were never
released by the Bottgers and the prior case raised no issue between
them. Its dismissal only barred the Bottgers from again asserting
a claim against the Gehrleins based on an allegation that the lease
rentals were different from what the Gehrleins represented them
to be.
102 These elements are: (a) Identity of subject matter; (b) Identity of cause of action; (c) Identity
of persons to the action; and (d) Identity of capacity in the persons for which or against whom the
claim is made.
103 Youngquest v. Youngquest, 102 Colo. 105, 110, 76 P.2d 1117, 1119 (1938).
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF EVIDENCE
By WALTER L. GERASH*
Many interesting problems in the law of evidence were con-
sidered by the Colorado Supreme Court among the important de-
cisions of that court in 1960. To the extent possible, the cases are
here divided into civil and criminal groupings.
I. CIVIL CASES
A. Examination and Cross-Examination of Witnesses
In Van Hise v. Trino,1 plaintiff in error claimed that the court
below erred when her counsel was not allowed to cross-examine
her on matter covered in direct examination. She was first called
as an adverse witness under Rule 43(b) of the Colorado Rules of
Civil Procedure by the opposing party. The court held that counsel
can cross-examine his own party if she is called initially for "cross-
examination under the rules." Although its denial was error in this
case, it was not prejudicial and reversible since the same matter
was covered when the witness-party testified in her own behalf in
her case-in-chief.
B. Opinion Evidence and Experts
There were several decisions that shed further light on who
may give an opinion on subject matter involved in a trial. In Ken-
dall v. Hargrave,2 plaintiff sued in tort for personal injuries and
damage to her automobile. She recovered only for property dam-
age, which was the exact amount stipulated by the parties. On er-
ror, the issue was whether the lay plaintiff could testify as to the
sums paid by her for medical treatment. The court not only an-
swered in the affirmative, but also held that the amounts testified
to were admissible to show some evidence of their reasonable value.
The witness can answer yes or no as to whether she has knowledge
of the amounts paid the doctors. What doctor bills are reasonable
are for doctors to decide.
In this same case, the high court invoked Rule 111 (f) of the
Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure in order to do justice to a liti-
gant. This rule allows the court, in its discretion, to notice any error
appearing of record although such error was not raised by writ of
error. Below, no instructions were given on the types of general
damages. The Supreme Court ruled that the lower court should
have so instructed, on its own motion, even though such instruction
was not tendered by the parties.
In Hoffman v. Brown,3 the general rule was affirmed as to who
is an expert; namely, it is up to the discretion of the trial court.
The court held that the value of damages to furnishings concerns
universal things and the "layman" who has experience in such mat-
ters may testify.
In Dandrea v. Board of County Comm'rs,4 plaintiff asked for
$100,000 damages and received $10. Plaintiff's claim was based on
* Mr. Gerash is a Denver attorney and a member of the Denver and Colorado Bar Associations.
1 352 P.2d 284 (Colo. 1960).
2 349 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1960).
. 354 P.2d 599 (Colo. 1960).
4 356 P.2d 893 (Colo. 1960).
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damage to property due to a change in the grade of a road. The
high court affirmed the decision and stated that the damage test
is the difference between the reasonable market value of the prop-
erty before and after impairment. The court ruled that plaintiff
merely proved the cost of bringing his property to the level of the
highway. Further, it stated that plaintiff's expert witness expressed
"opinion buttressed by assumed facts at variance with actual facts
[and] has no evidential efficacy." In another case,5 the court noted
that if an expert testifies, there should be an expert witness in-
struction.
C. The Parol Evidence Rule
The parol evidence rule and its classical exceptions were in-
terpreted in five cases. Since the rule is a part of the substantive
law of contracts, comment will be limited.
In Witherspoon v. Pusch,6 seller brought suit for breach of con-
tract and on a $7,500 check, upon which payment had been stopped.
Parol testimony was admitted to show there was no contract at all.
Evidence showed that the real estate option contract did not em-
brace a firm offer, as the buyer's check Was to be held until further
investigation of the property.
Von Risen v. Greeley Finance Co.7 affirms one of the excep-
tions to the parol evidence rule by holding that if a writing is a
mere note or memorandum of the agreement between the parties,
it can be explained by parol evidence.
In Arch A. Edwards Post No. 252 v. Gould," plaintiff sought to
have a deed absolute on its face declared a mortgage. While parol
evidence can be introduced to show that such a deed was in fact a
mortgage transaction, the burden of proof must be by clear and
convincing evidence. Disparity between offer and selling price,
$210,000 and $72,214.33 respectively, was held to be insufficient to
sustain the burden of proof.
The parol evidence rule was upheld in King Collection Bureau
v. Burns.! This was an action on a promissory note by an assignee.
Summary judgment was entered for the defendant when plaintiff
attempted to plead a parol agreement in his reply. The court held
that the reply was contrary to the terms of the note, which were
clear and unambiguous.
In Marlatt v. LaGrange,10 defendants in error as plaintiffs be-
low sued to recover a deposit of $2,000 made as a down payment
on a purchase of a residence. The option contract stated:
The entire price to be paid is Eighteen Thousand Five
Hundred and No/100 Dollars ($50.00) of which the amount
as above stated is a part, and the balance ($18,450.00) to be
paid as follows: $2,000.00 in cash including the above de-
posit on or before ten days from date; Obtain maximum
loan and balance to be carried on 2nd Deed of Trust by
Seller, on or before 3 years.
The court ruled for plaintiff, holding the term "Obtain maximum
5 Sabon v. People, 350 P.2d 576 (Colo. 1960).
6 349 P.2d 137 (Colo. 1960).
7 350 P.2d 340 (Colo. 1960).
8 356 P.2d 908 (Colo. 1960).
9 354 P.2d 609 (Colo. 1960).
10 357 P.2d 927 (Colo. 1960).
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loan" is vague and indefinite. Thus, the court would entertain parol
evidence to determine the intention of the parties.
D. Presumptions, Inferences and Burden of Proof
When should a trial judge take a case from the jury and direct
a verdict for the defendant? The general rule was recently restated
in two cases" in which the court said: "It is only in the clearest of
cases, where the facts are undisputed and it is plain that all in-
telligent man can draw but one inference from them, that the ques-
tion is ever one for the court." In the same vein the court, in Drake
v. Lerner Shops,12 upheld a directed verdict rendered below against
the plaintiff-invitee. It held that a five-inch step plus the reflecting
sun from the old May Company building, with conflicting photo-
graphic evidence as to the efficacy of the warnings, was not such a
hazard and unreasonable risk of harm as to require determination
by the jury.
The plaintiffs in most civil cases still have to prove their cases
by a preponderance of the evidence.
13
When will our high court reverse a case on the weight of the
evidence? If there is a conflict in the evidence, the jury resolves
it, and unless the determination is so manifestly against the weight
of the evidence as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Supreme
Court will not interfere. Thus, in Thomas v. Davis14 the court af-
firmed the jury's special verdicts on conflicting evidence on issues
of undue influence and testamentary capacity.
In Noel v. Jones,15 the plaintiff, a patron of the defendant,
slipped and fell upon entering defendant's business establishment.
There was a judgment for the defendant. Plaintiff brought error
on two instructions. The high court held one instruction on con-
structive notice to be inconsistent and also one of the propositions
wrong. Not only was the jury instructed on plaintiff's burden to
prove by a preponderance but also that plaintiff must prove the
defect clearly and definitely. The court also held erroneous the in-
struction on intoxication on three grounds: (1) It did not connect
the intoxication with the occurrence; (2) It permitted an inference
of intoxication from one drink of alcoholic liquor; (3) It was given
as an abstract proposition of law without any application to the
facts of the case.
The court also held an instruction erroneous which attempted
to shift the burden onto respondent. 16
E. The Dead Man's Statute
One of the remaining vestiges of competency is still inexorably
applied. A surviving partner sued the executor of the deceased
partner's estate for an accounting. An accountant who was not a
party in interest testified. He based part of his testimony on a
private memorandum kept by the decedent. While the lower court
excluded the memorandum under the statute, 17 it allowed the ac-
11 Gray v. Turner, 350 P.2d 1043, 1044 (Colo. 1960); Bailey v. King Soopers, 350 P.2d 810, 811
(Colo. 1960).
12 357 P.2d 624 (Colo. 1960).
13 Superior Distrib. Corp. v. Hadden Theatre Supply Co., 356 P.2d 266 (Colo. 1960).
14 356 P.2d 963 (Colo. 1960); accord, Trenchard v. Dutton Realty Co., 347 P.2d 959 (Colo. 1960).
15 350 P.2d 815 (Colo. 1960).
16 Sabon v. People, supra note 5.
17 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 153-1-2 (1953).
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countant to testify. The court held the "Dead Man's Statute" also
applied to the accountant's testimony based on the memorandum
and reversed the ruling below.
18
One of the exceptions to the statute was discussed in Thomas v.
Davis.19 The court affirmed the allowing of beneficiaries named
in the will to testify as to the testator's mental condition since they
were called as witnesses by the caveatrix, the adverse party.
F. Privilege
In Carey v. Stopp2° the attorney-client privilege was recog-
nized, but such testimony as shown in the offer of proof was irrel-
evant in and of itself, and its exclusion was upheld.
The husband-wife privilege was given new interpretation this
year in the Sabon case.21 This was a civil case for an adjudication
of mental illness. The high court held it was not error to permit the
wife to testify in the proceeding. Justice Day, speaking for the
court, stated that the privilege is statutory2  and that it is not ap-
plicable to a mental health proceeding. (Thus, the court seemed
to be governed by considering whether the testimony was adverse
to the party invoking the privilege). It held that the wife's testi-
mony was not for or against the husband, but was merely to show
her husband's mental condition by his acts. The decision restricts
the husband-wife privilege.
G. The Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions
In the Oswald case,23 a memorandum book of a deceased party
could not be used by an accountant for the basis of his testimony.
While the shop-book rule is an exception to the hearsay rule, one
of the requirements was missing-it was not a book of original en-
try. The other two requirements are that the entry must be con-
temporaneous with the event and must be done in the ordinary
course of business.
In a prior trial a certain witness testified. At a second trial both
parties stipulated and adopted this witness' prior testimony. The
court did not allow his testimony to be impeached for inconsistency,
since the witness was not present to be confronted.
24
18 Oswald v. Dawn, 354 P.2d 505 (Colo. 1960).
19 Supro note 14.
20 350 P.2d 1062 (Colo. 1960).
21 Supra note 5.
22 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 153-1-7 (1953).
23 Supra note 18.
24 Grandell v. Tyler, 355 P.2d 1091 (Colo. 1960).
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Another case 5 held that it is pure hearsay to admit a doctor's
report into evidence as an exhibit. Reports of such kind may be
used as aids in cross-examination of medical witnesses but are still
hearsay.
H. Exhibits
In Stewart v. Stout,2 6 plaintiff objected to the admission of a
diagram which was part of a traffic-accident report of an investiga-
tor. On previous cross-examination of the plaintiff, plaintiff ad-
mitted the diagram was a correct representation of the position of
the cars. Since the purpose of the diagram was to modify or cor-
rect plaintiff's free-hand drawing on the blackboard, the court al-
lowed it to be admitted for that purpose.
In Tucker v. Dixon,2 7 plaintiff below broke two teeth as she
surfaced in a pool. She struck a detached float. Defendant offered
two exhibits which were pictures of a permanent dividing line be-
tween the shallow and deep ends marked with floats which were
kept permanently in place with a rope or wire. Defendant offered
the exhibits to show the customary use of floats. The court reject-
ed the exhibits as immaterial and the high court affirmed.
I. The Court as a Fact-Finder
How long can a court sitting as a jury keep a matter under ad-
visement? Three years, eight and one-half months was deemed too
long. The court said that findings of fact and conclusions of law
could not be based on a recollection of the testimony of witnesses
and an appraisal of their credibility after so long a delay. 2
II. CRIMINAL CASES
A. Materiality and Relevancy
How far can the prosecution go to show evidence of other
crimes or offenses? A 1959 case, Stull v. People,2 9 was an excellent
treatise on the law of "similar acts." It analyzed the rules and pre-
scribed the necessary procedural fairness as follows:
1. The District Attorney should advise the court of the
purpose for which he offers such evidence.
2. If such evidence is admitted, the court should in-
struct the jury then and there of its limited purpose.
3. A renewal of No. 2 in the instructions.
4. Use "other transactions," "acts" or "conduct," not
similar crimes or similar offenses.
In spite of the above guidance, evidence of seven separate of-
fenses was shown in the trial court in the Kostal case, 30-four in
California, two in Missouri, and one in Colorado. The court re-
versed the death penalty below and granted a new trial. In the
same case, however, the court ruled that evidence of flight is rel-
evant and admissible on the question of guilt, however slight. Ac-
cordingly, evidence of the defendant's arrest in New York City was
deemed not to be error.
25 Panion v. Crichton, 355 P.2d 938 (Colo. 1960).
26 351 P.2d 938 (Colo. 1960).
27 355 P.2d 79 (Colo. 1960).
28 Hartfert v. Silvolo, 356 P.2d 133 (Colo. 1960).
29 140 Colo. 278, 344 P.2d 455 (1959).
30 Kostal v. People, 357 P.2d 70 (Colo. 1960).
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B. The Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions
1. Dying Declaration.-Two defendants were charged with ag-
gravated robbery.3 1 One committed suicide while in custody. The
remaining defendant tried to introduce the statement of the de-
ceased co-defendant, which cleared the remaining defendant. The
lower court was affirmed when it held that the statement was hear-
say and not a dying declaration since the defendant testified that
the statement was made three weeks prior to the suicide. Lacking
was the requirement that the declarant be consciously aware of his
impending death.
2. Confession.-In the case of Cardoza v. People,32 defendant
pleaded guilty to murder. On appeal of a life sentence, defendant
urged that his confession through an interpreter was coerced. The
court ruled that no claim or objection was made below that the con-
fession was not voluntary and that the matter urged on error was
not raiged in defendant's motion for a new trial, but went on to rule
whether the confession was coerced. The court stated that the testi-
mony itself entirely negated any such contention.
One case33 held that the issue of a coerced confession cannot
be raised by habeas corpus but only by writ of error in Colorado.
This case is in line with the oft-repeated but unfortunate rule in
Colorado that one cannot raise constitutional issues by a writ of
habeas corpus.
3 4
In Gallegos v. People,3 5 the court carefully analyzed the con-
fession of a fourteen year old boy convicted of murder. First, it
held that although the same evidence was given first in a delin-
quency proceeding, it did not violate the Colorado statute that pro-
vides:
A disposition of any child under this article, or any
evidence given in any such case, shall not in any criminal
or other cause or proceeding whatever be lawful or proper
evidence against such child, for any purpose excepting in
subsequent cases against the same child under this arti-
cle .... 36
The court held, "It is only the evidence as introduced at the hear-
ing in the juvenile court which cannot be used against the child in
subsequent court proceedings. '3 7 Thus, nothing prevented the dis-
trict attorney from establishing the same facts by the same wit-
nesses and the same real and documentary evidence that may have
been used at the prior juvenile proceeding. It is interesting to note
that no question of former jeopardy was raised. The court went on
to decide that on the facts, the confession was voluntary.
Since the voluntariness of a confession, even on the state level,
also raises a federal issue, that of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution, it behooves
counsel to have a working knowledge of the federal practice.38
31 Wilson v. People, 354 P.2d 588 (Colo. 1960).
32 354 P.2d 504 (Colo. 1960).
33 Moore v. Tinsley, 351 P.2d 456 (Colo. 1960).
34 Rivera v. People, 128 Colo. 549, 265 P.2d 226 (1953); Hart v. Best, 119 Colo. 569, 205 P.2d
787 (1949); Scott, Post-Conviction Remedies in Colorado Criminal Cases, 31 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 249 (1959).
35 358 P.2d 1028 (Colo. 1960).
36 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-8-1(3) (1953).
37 Supra note 35 at 1032.
38 An excellent summary is contained in a note, 4 t. Ed. 2d 1833.
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3. Admissions.-In Hackett v. Tinsley,39 petitioner brought ha-
beas corpus for his release serving a sentence under the habitual
criminal act. He claimed there was no proof of the prior felony
convictions. The high court held that by admitting his identity and
the prior convictions from the witness stand he made a judicial ad-
mission. This was held to be a sufficient proof of the prior felonies
as required by O'Day v. People.40
C. Exhibits
So effective was demonstrative evidence in Falcon v. People41
that it wove a web of circumstances around the defendant. A bloody
T-shirt, a pair of scissors with a minute spot of blood on it, two
sheets and a pillow, a bloody green towel, a photograph of the de-
ceased showing stab wounds, combined with other indirect testi-
monial evidence, convicted defendant of second-degree murder.
D. Circumstantial Evidence
In Falcon v. People,42 the court quotes Militello v. People43 as
to what is circumstantial evidence.
A case of circumstantial evidence ... implies the weav-
ing of a fabric of known facts, which, often infinitesimal
or immaterial, or even prejudicial when considered alone,
become important only as they are tied to others, and when
so tied lead to the inevitable conclusions to facts in issue.
In Rueda v. People4  the defendant was found in possession of five
pairs of shoes identified as those taken in a burglary. The court
held that this possession itself raises a presumption of guilt of lar-
ceny or burglary unless the attending circumstances or other evi-
dence overcomes this presumption.
E. Illegal Search and Seizure
Article II, Section 18, of the Colorado Constitution still is in-
terpreted so as to allow evidence obtained as a result of an illegal
search and seizure to be admitted in a court of law.
45
A contrary trend seems to be going as the states swing over to
the federal exclusionary rule of People v. Cahan . 6 Even the federal
"silver platter doctrine" is now dead. This old doctrine held that
if state officials do the illegal searching and se'zing without the
connivance or cooperation with the federal officials, the latter may
take the ill-gotten fruit on a silver platter and introduce it into
evidence in a federal court.
47
Now, evidence obtained by state officers during a search which,
if conducted by federal officers, would have violated the defen-
dant's immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures under
the fourth amendment, is inadmissible over the defendant's timely
objection in a federal criminal trial.
39 352 P.2d 799 (Colo. 1960).
40 114 Colo. 373, 166 P.2d 789 (1946).
41 352 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1960).
42 Ibid.
43 95 Colo. 519, 37 P.2d 527 (1934).
44 348 P.2d 957 (Colo. 1960).
45 Miller v. People, 349 P.2d 685 (1960); This follows Wolf v. People, 117 Colo. 279, 187 P.2d
926 (1947), affirmed in 338 U.S. 25 and Wolf v. People, 117 Colo. 321, 187 P.2d 928 (1947).
46 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905, 50 A.L.R. 2d 513 (1955).
47 Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1948). That the doctrine no longer exists, see Rios v.
United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960) and Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
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Even a guest has a sufficient property interest to bring a mo-
tion to supress due to illegal search and seizure under Rule 41 (e) .4
F. Opinion
The recent case of Johnson v. People49 follows prior Colorado
law and holds that a state of intoxication is a condition about which
a lay person may express an opinion.50
G. Self-Incrimination
Early v. People51 deals with several points of constitutional law.
One of the issues is whether a pre-arraignment mental examina-
tion and its contents given by way of testimony of the examining
doctors at the trial violates Article II, Section 18, of the Colorado
Constitution. The court held the interview was not a proceeding
where an oath was required. Since the statement was voluntary,
there was no violation of due process of law. There is a blistering
minority dissent.
H. Testimony of an Accomplice
In Mendelsohn v. People5 2 defendant was charged with four
counts of arson. One L was jointly charged. Before trial, L pleaded
guilty and was given probation. Defendant was convicted on three
counts.
The court affirmed the Colorado rule that testimony of an ac-.
complice, while it need not be corroborated, must be received with
great caution. If this testimony standing alone is relied upon for a
conviction, it must be clear and convincing and show guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. In this case, however, the court said the ac-
complice's testimony was corroborated.
48 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
49 357 P.2d 69 (Colo. 1960).
50 See Bauer v. People, 103 Colo. 449, 86 P.2d 1088 (1939); and McRae v. People, 131 Colo. 492,
286 P.2d 618 (1955).
51 352 P.2d 112 (Colo. 1960).
52 353 P.2d 587 (Colo. 1960).
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF PROPERTY LAW
By KARL P. WARDEN*
Approximately fifty-five cases bearing some direct relation to
the law of property were handed down by the Supreme Court of
the State of Colorado during the year 1960. From these, twenty-five
cases have been selected to be included in this year-end review of
property law. It is well nigh impossible to select a happy medium
in the approach to such a review. If one is academically inclined,
the resulting product delights the scholar but fails the busy prac-
titioner. If the format is one of simple digest, then neither the prac-
titioner nor the scholar is pleased. An effort has been made in this
writing to digest the digestible and to chew for a time on the indi-
gestible.
I. PERSONAL PROPERTY
Bank of Denver v. LeglerI should be of substantial interest to
banks and other institutions dealing in personal property purchase
money loans. Here application was made to a bank for a loan to
purchase a service station. The purchase price being $5,500, the
bank agreed to loan $4,000 to the prospective purchaser. The about-
to-be purchaser executed and delivered to the bank a chattel mort-
gage, and in turn received from the bank a check for $4,000. The
bank promptly recorded its mortgage. The purchaser delivered this
check, plus his note for $1,500 to the vendor. The vendor then exe-
cuted his bill of sale to the property and promptly took back a chat-
tel mortgage to secure the purchaser's $1,500 note. Almost a year
passed before the vendor recorded his chattel mortgage. The pur-
chaser defaulted on both mortgages and the resulting contest in-
volved the bank and the vendor as to the priority of their liens. The
Supreme Court decided in favor of the vendor. The court reasoned
that the execution of the bill of sale and the return of the chattel
mortgage to the vendor being practically simultaneous acts, the title
to the property never rested in the purchaser unencumbered by the
vendor's mortgage. Thus, the vendor was entitled to preference
over all other claims and liens through the mortgagor even though
those other liens were prior in time and in recordation. Financial
institutions should take heed from this case and make a definite
part of their procedure some communication with the prospective
vendor in order to determine his willingness to subordinate any
claim he might have for a purchase price balance to that of the
financial institution who advances the larger part of the purchase
price.
One of the most common legal misconceptions is the mistaken
notion that a bailee has a duty to return the object bailed in its
original condition, and that if he does not, he will be absolutely li-
able for the damage to the property. Johnson v. Willey 2 could fur-
ther this notion if the opinion is not read carefully. In the case,
which finds in favor of the bailor, this statement appears: "Since
in law the duty to return bailed property in an undamaged condi-
*Assistant Professor of Low, University of Denver Low Center.
I 350 P.2d 1059 (Colo. 1960).
2 351 P.2d 840 (Colo. 1960).
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tion is the same whether the bailment is for hire or for the benefit
of the bailee . . .,3 A careful reading shows clearly that the bailee
defendant failed to put on any evidence and for this reason the
prima facie case made by the showing of a bailment and by the
showing of the damage to the bailed article was sufficient to sup-
port a judgment for damages. The rule governing such situations
in Colorado is laid down in Nutt v. Davison4 cited by the court in
the Johnson case, and it is this:
[I] n cases where the evidence shows that the property was
delivered to the bailee in good condition and returned dam-
aged, or not at all, the presumption of negligence on the
part of the bailee instantly arises, making a prima facie case
in favor of the bailor, and thereupon the bailee is under the
necessity, if he would escape liability, of showing that the
damage or loss was not due to his negligence. This may be
done, inter alia, by showing that he exercised a degree of
care, under all the facts and circumstances, sufficient to
overcome the presumption of negligence.
In this day of form contracts governing the conditions of bailments,
attorneys tend to overlook classic bailment arrangements. The at-
torneys in the Johnson case should be commended for recognizing
a bailment in a far from typical situation.
II. BROKERS
Witherspoon v. Pusch5 called upon the court to examine ar-
rangements between a broker and a potential purchaser of real
property and to determine the consequences of these arrangements
to the vendor. The potential purchaser orally agreed with the
broker that the $1,500 check handed to the broker at the time of
signing the offer to purchase and the signed offer to purchase were
merely conveniences designed to make it unnecessary for the par-
ties to get together again if the purchaser should decide the prop-
erty was suitable for her purposes. Very shortly thereafter the
purchaser stopped payment on the check. The court allowed the
showing of these circumstances not because they were offered to
vary the terms of a written contract, but to show that there was no
contract at all. The vendor contended, however, that such agree-
ments made between the potential buyer and the broker could not
be binding on the vendor because the contract was only between
the vendor and the purchaser and the broker was not a party to the
contract. The Supreme Court answered this contention by saying:
This contention is answered in Wehner v. Schrader, 119
Colo. 518, 205 P.2d 225, 9 A.L.R. 2d 489, wherein the role
of a real estate broker, who has a listing to find a pur-
chaser for a seller, is well defined. Here we have a find-
ing of the trial court, amply supported by the evidence,
that Kelly was, in fact, the agent of [the vendor] ."
A reading of the Wehner case, referred to by the court, does not
clearly disclose any answer to the question raised by the vendor in
3 Id. at 841.
4 54 Colo. 586, 588, 131 Poc. 390, 391 (1913).
5 349 P.2d 137 (Colo. 1960).
6 Id. at 138-39.
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this case.7 But there can be no question that the principal case
holds that in Colorado a broker is capable of binding his principal
when he, acting within the scope of his apparent authority, agrees
to accept an offer to purchase conditioned upon the happening of
subsequent events. Whether this is new law, or old law affirmed,
depends on your interpretation of the Wehner v. Schrader case.
That the duty of a broker to "produce" a ready, willing and able
buyer does not mean only a casual causal relationship is made clear
in Fistell v. Thomas8 and Pyles v. Colorado Land and Investment
Co.9 handed down by the court in 1960. Both cases add their weight
to a long series of Colorado cases that spell out in no uncertain
terms that real estate brokers will not be allowed to collect a com-
mission on the sale of real property in the absence of a genuine ef-
fort which actually results in the production of a buyer who negoti-
ates with the vendor as a direct result of the broker's efforts. As
was said in Hayutin v. De Andrea,10 the broker must be the pre-
dominating effective cause of the sale, and not merely "one of the
links in a chain of causes.""
III. ZONING LAW
Two zoning ordinance cases decided by the court in 1960 are
worthy of some consideration.
The first of these cases, Nelson v. Farr,12 involves a finding by
a trial court that certain zoning ordinances adopted by the city of
Greeley are invalid or unconstitutional. After so finding, the trial
court declared the ordinances null and void and then enjoined the
enforcement of any ordinance contrary to certain restrictive coven-
ants found by that court to be imposed on the land in question. The
Supreme Court found nothing illegal or irregular in the adoption
of the ordinances by the city. The court then said:
The court's order, in effect, re-zoned the property as Resi-
dential A and prohibited the city from altering such zoning
in conflict with the court's determination that the property
be devoted exclusively to single family dwellings. This is
a usurpation of a legislative function."
i
The Supreme Court quoted with approval 62 C.J.S. Municipal Cor-
porations, §228(1), 557-558, to the effect that judicial review of
municipal zoning and building regulations is generally limited to
their validity and the courts may not substitute their judgment for
that of the municipality by an attempted control of the zoning pow-
er or by directing that zoning ordinances be repealed, enacted or
amended.
Another facet of the Nelson case merits discussion. The grantor
of a tract of subdivided land sold each building site with a restric-
tion in the deed limiting building thereon to single family dwell-
ings. This particular tract had been annexed to the city, but no re-
strictions were made in the plat. The grantor retained another tract
of land contiguous to, but not encompassed within, the annexed
7 The Wehner case does allow the principal to take advantage of any contract terms added by his
agent-broker, but the case does not discuss the other side of the coin, i.e., whether the principal would
be bound by such terms if made without his knowledge or actual authority.
8 355 P.2d 105 (Colo. 1960).
9 355 P.2d 953 (Colo. 1960). See Dunklee v. Shepherd, 358 P.2d 25 (Colo. 1960).
10 139 Colo. 40, 337 P.2d 383 (1959).
11 355 P.2d at 956.
12 354 P.2d 163 (Colo. 1960).
13 Id. at 166 (Emphasis Supplied).
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tract, and this retained tract gave birth to the controversy. The
purchasers of sites in the annexed tract attempted by this case to
impose the restrictions placed on their property against the retained
land. The Supreme Court said there was nothing in the record or
recorded instruments restricting the use of the retained, non-an-
nexed tract, and that the conduct of the grantor demonstrated clear-
ly that such was not his intent. The court cited numerous authori-
ties for the proposition that a restriction on the use of land is to be
construed most strongly against the grantor and in favor of the free
use of the property. No mention was made in the opinion of the
court of the'presence of a scheme or of the doctrine of reciprocal
negative easements. If Colorado accepts the doctrine of reciprocal
negative easements,14 then clearly the land retained by the grantor
within the subdivided tract would be restricted to the same extent
as the granted land. If the grantor conveyed away any of this re-
tained land, his successors in title might be subject to equitable
servitudes co-extensive with the restrictions placed on the granted
land. From here it is but one step to extend this reasoning to en-
compass other lands retained by the grantor which were a part of
the original "scheme of development." Thus, had there been a show-
ing in the principal case of a general scheme which included the
retained non-annexed land, the absence of any statement in the re-
corder's office of such a plan would not prevent the imposition of
the restrictions desired by the plaintiffs in this case. This is not in-
tended as a criticism of the principal case. It is offered only as a
suggestion as to a possible approach to the problem should some
future plaintiff's attorney find himself faced with the need to show
restrictions on retained land where none appear of record.
A second zoning case considered by the court in 1960, Trailer
Towns, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment,15 involved land zoned under
local ordinance as R-C Residential Commercial. This R-C land is
limited in the resolution thus: "No building or land shall be used
and no building shall be hereafter erected ... except for one or
more of the following uses." There followed a long list of uses, in-
cluding "Any use permitted in any Residential District." Another
separate section of the resolution set up the category described as
"R-T Residential Trailer District" wherein provision was made for
lands to be used as trailer parks.
Application was made to construct a trailer park on land zoned
as R-C Residential Commercial. The board denied the application,
and this ruling was upheld by the trial court. The Supreme Court
reversed the trial court and held that an R-T Residential Trailer
District is embraced in the language "any Residential District" ap-
pearing in the above quoted portion of the Residential Commercial
section. On this point the court said, "It may be that such was not
intended by the planning commission, but the plaintiff was and is
justified in being guided by the wording of the resolution rather
than by a secret or unexpressed intent of the commission."1 6 By
this holding the court has emphasized the word "any" in the phrase
"any Residential District" and has, in keeping with a vast majority
14 A case which gives rise to the belief that Colorado does recognize reciprocal negative ease-
ments in principle is Judd v. Robinson, 41 Colo. 222, 92 Poc. 724 (1907).
15 356 P.2d 251 (Colo. 1960).
16 Id. at 253.
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of cases from other. jurisdictions, construed "any" to mean "all" or
"every." A different result might have been reached had the court
emphasized "Residential."
IV. MINING LAW - TAXATION
Rummel v. Musgrave"7 raises a question of substantial impor-
tance to holders of leases of United States land when the lease is a
mine or mining claim. C.R.S. 137-5-4 (1953) reads, in part:
All mines and mining claims bearing ... valuable minerals
and possessory rights therein classified under the laws of
this state as producing mines shall be assessed annually
for the purpose of taxation .... (3) In case the mine or
mining claim shall not be patented, or entered for patent,
but shall be assessable and taxable ... then the possession
shall be the subject of the assessment ....
Under this section a tax was charged to the lessee of producing
uranium lands under a lease from the United States. The lessee
contends that: (1) The statute above quoted does not apply, and
(2) if it does apply, it amounts to an unconstitutional taxation by
the State of Colorado on real estate owned by the United States.
The court, in an exceptionally well reasoned opinion, rejected both
of plaintiff's contentions. The court said that a leasehold interest
is a possessory interest, separate and distinct from ownership. Fur-
ther, that by this tax on the lessee's possesion, no burden, direct or
indirect, has been placed on any part of the bundle of rights which
makes up the United States property in the leased land. The court
upheld the assessment as one on possession, not on ownership, and




McKinley v. Dunn1 9 resolves any doubts as to a seeming con-
flict between C.R.S. 149-3-23 to 33 (1953) and C.R.S. 149-3-55 to 66
(1953). C.R.S. 149-3-23 (1953) reads, in part: "The board of direc-
tors of any irrigation district may sell or dispose of any part or all
of the irrigation works, franchises, water rights or other property of
the district . .." C.R.S. 149-3-55 (1953) reads "Any irrigation district
... may be dissolved in the manner provided in sections 149-3-55 to
149-3-65." (The sections referred to make provision for sale of the
assets of the irrigation district.)
The court said these sections must be construed to be harmoni-
ous, if at all possible, and that to do otherwise would amount to
judicial repeal of legislation. To achieve this desired end the court
held that sections 55 to 66 govern the procedure to be followed
when complete dissolution of the irrigation district is sought (as in
the principal case). If the assets of the district are to be sold with-
out dissolution of the district, then sections 23 to 33 govern the pro-
cedure to be followed. Thus, it is possible under sections 23 to 33 to
sell all of the assets of the irrigation district and still not dissolve
the district, but it is not possible to dissolve the district under sec-
tions 55 to 66 without making some disposition of all of the district's
17 350 P.2d 825 (Colo. 1960).
18 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld. See, e.g., Hohfeld, W. N., Fundamental Legal Concsr.en; at. ix-;ed
in Judicial Reasoning (1923).
19 349 P.2d 139 (Colo. 1960).
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assets and this is to be done only according to the provisions in sec-
tions 55 to 66. Because the difference in procedure set forth in these
separate groups of sections is substantial, the resolution of the ap-
parent conflict by the court will be welcomed by attorneys involved
in irrigation district problems.
A rule of law, long supposed to be true but never specifically
decided in Colorado, was spelled out in Town of Genoa v. Westfall.
"-
The court held that "appropriation of water to beneficial use" is not
confined to appropriation by mechanical devices, ditches or other
artificial methods of removing water from a stream. The only in-
dispensable requirements, in order that a valid appropriation be
made, are that the appropriator intends to use the waters for a
beneficial purpose and that he actually applies them to that use.
The conclusion seems quite sound.
VI. CONDEMNATION
Welch v. City and County of Denver2 1 involved a so-called
"give away" of park lands held in trust by the city. The "give
away" was actually a sale of park lands by the city to the State of
Colorado for the purpose of widening a state highway. Welch, a
citizen and taxpayer of the city, based her claim on a provision of
the city charter which provided that "No portion of any park land
now belonging to or hereafter acquired by the City and County of
Denver shall be sold or leased at any time. '12 2 The court held that
such a charter provision does not prevent the state, under its power
to condemn lands for highway purposes, from acquiring such land.
The court says that there are no limitations on the type of property
that can be acquired by the state, through condemnation proceed-
ings or otherwise, for highway purposes. The court goes on to point
out that where a mutual agreement is reached between the city
and the state through arms length negotiations, then there is no
need for actual condemnation proceedings. The court cites an ear-
lier Colorado case, Chitwood v. City and County of Denver,23 for
the proposition that such negotiations eliminate the delay, expense
aud uncertainty of such litigation when the fact of condemnation is
certain. In his dissenting opinion, Mr. Chief Justice Sutton points
out that the land was held in trust for the people of Denver, and
these people had a special, as distinguished from a general, interest
20 349 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1960).
21 349 P.2d 352 (Colo. 1960).
22 Id. at 353.
23 119 Colo. 165, 201 P.2d 605 (1949).
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in the property. He reasons that the people, as trust beneficiaries,
should have been given their day in court in an actual condemna-
tion proceeding. "It is their equitable right, not that of the mere
legal title holder, which is involved. '24 Though Justice Sutton does
not dissent from the proposition that the city charter provision
against the sale of park lands must fall before the power of the state
in condemnation proceedings, he points out the very important fact
that if these citizens were given their day in court they might well
show the taking to be unnecessary, or show that arrangements other
than those proposed by the state and accepted by the city were
more desirable, or show that the amount proposed for payment for
the land is not adequate in light of the damage done. The logic of
such a position seems inescapable. Why should the city be allowed
to sit as judge, jury and advocate on its own trusteeship?
VII. LAND DESCRIPTION
In Town of Cherry Hills Village v. Shafroth,25 a case involving
a petition to disconnect twenty-one acres of agricultural land from
a village, the petitioner was required to show that no part of such
area had been platted into lots or blocks as a part of, or'an addition
to, the village.2 6 The particular land was bounded on the north and
on the east by roadways. These roadways were in existence prior
to the platting and were not dedicated as a part of the platting. No
other streets or avenues touched the tract. The court held that un-
der these circumstances the land had not been platted into lots or
blocks within the meaning of the statute and that the disconnection
was properly allowed.
A boundary line dispute arising from the relocation of the north
boundary line of a township faced the court in Marr v. Shrader.
2 7
The change was caused by a resurvey by the United States. De-
fendant claimed under a patent based on the original government
survey. Plaintiff claimed on the basis of the amended survey. The
court quoted 43 U.S.C.A. §772 (1952) giving the Secretary of the
Interior power to resurvey government lands which provides:
" [N] o such resurvey or retracement shall be so executed as to im-
pair the bona fide rights or claims of any claimant, entryman, or
owner of lands affected by such resurvey or retracement." The
court held that this enactment means precisely what it says, "If one
of two innocent parties must suffer a loss of land due to boundary
line readjustments called for by later official surveys, it must fall
upon the plaintiff here who is later in time and who has never been
in actual possession of the eighty acres in question. ' '2s The court
did not intimate what the result might have been had neither party
been in actual possession, i.e., one party in "constructive" possession.
No reason can be seen why the result would not have been the
same, especially since the code provision seems clearly to favor the
party first in time.
Another aspect of the Marr case should be mentioned. An abs-
tract and supplemental abstract of title were offered in this case to
show "title" and to show "color of title " The court distinguished
24 Chitwood, supro, note 23 at 356.
25 349 P.2d 368 (Colo. 1960).
26 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 139-13-2(4) (1953).
27 349 P.2d 706 (Cobo. 1960)
28 Id. at 71"
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an early case, Parks v. Roth,-") where it was held that a tax deed of-
fered solely as color of title could not be used to prove title itself.
The court said that the Parks case does not hold that the same in-
strument may not serve both as color of title and as evidence of title
itself. They go on to point out that if an instrument is offered for
both purposes, then opposing counsel should be afforded the oppor-
tunity to object to any lack of requisites necessary to prove "title"
at the time the exhibit is offered. "We can, however, conceive of no
circumstance under which a document tendered as proof of title it-
self and so admitted in evidence could be objectionable as proof of
the lesser status of mere color of title. '30 The lesser may not be
used to prove the greater, but the greater may be used to prove the
lesser-a neat and useful distinction for the practicing attorney.
Another problem of land description was brought to the court's
attention in Wallace v. Hirsch."1 A conflict between course and dis-
tance and the call for the termination point gave rise to the dispute.
The erroneous description was: "thence South 63' 05' West 2910
feet, more or less, to the SW corner of the NW 1/4 SW 1/4 of said
Section 20. "32 Here, if the course 63' 05' West is followed, it will
never intersect the SW corner of the fraction section described.
Plaintiff contended that the true boundary line is that line
which intersects the corner regardless of angle. Defendant's posi-
tion was that the course and distance should prevail. The court
recognized that when there is a misdescription in a deed the court
must ascertain the true intent of the parties. Then the court an-
nounced that an examination of the plaintiff's deed "leads to the
inescapable conclusion13 3 that the boundary line should terminate
at the SW corner. The court cites the rule of construction (rules of
construction always lead to "inescapable conclusions") that monu-
ments will generally control over conflicting calls for course and
distance. Do you wonder where there has been any mention of a
monument? The court continues:
True, there may not be a monument, as such, at the 'SW
corner of the NW 1/4 SW 1/4 of said Section 20', although
there was some evidence that a pile of rocks had been
placed at this point. Nevertheless, the 'SW corner of the
NW 1/4 SW 1/4 of said Section 20' describes a specific
point which is capable of being determined with absolute
certainty.
4
Then the court cites a Washington case, Matthews v. Parker,-' for
the principle that a point capable of being mathematically ascer-
tained is a monument in the legal sense.
In the absence of a pile of rocks, what is the "SW corner of the
NW 1/4 SW 1/4 of said Section 20"? To raise it from the mere
termination point of a line drawn due north 1320 feet along the
west side of Section 20, into the higher status of the intersection of
two lines drawn by means of courses and distances, it is necessary
to describe it as that point where a line drawn due west from the
29 25 Colo. App. 296, 137 Pac. 76 (1913).
30 349 P.2d at 709-710.
31 350 P.2d 560 (Colo. 1960).
32 Id. at 561.
33 Id. at 563.
34 Id. at 564.
35 163 Wash. 10, 299 Pac. 354.
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center of the SW 1/4 of Section 20 (a point capable of being mathe-
matically ascertained) intersects with a line drawn from the NW
corner of Section 20 to the SW corner of Section 20.
The rule that courses and distances established by Government
Surveys are monuments and thus prevail over other courses and
distances will be of great benefit to lawyers and abstract companies
in Colorado who are frequently faced with the need for more pre-
cise methods of determining the true intent of parties who have
erred in the description of property boundary lines.
Isenberg v. Woitchek 6 brings to Colorado a generally well es-
tablished rule of law. In the case the court cites numerous authori-
ties to support the proposition that when a conveyance describes an
easement only in general terms, leaving uncertain the scope and
location of the easement, the practical location in use by the grantee
and the grantor's acquiesence in that use at the time of the grant
and a long time subsequent thereto will locate the easement and
will be deemed to be that which was intended3
7
VIII. LIENS
Stinnett v. Modern Homes, Inc. 8 involves the prdblem of the
priority of a mechanic's lien under C.R.S. 86-3-3 (1953), which reads
in pertinent part:
When the lien is for work done or material furnished for
any entire structure, erection or improvement, such lien
shall attach to such building, erection or improvement for
or upon which the work was done, or materials furnished,
in preference to any prior lien or encumbrance, or mort-
gage upon the land upon which the same is erected ...
Here a deed of trust on certain residential property was recorded
in 1954. A mechanic's lien for remodeling of the same property was
recorded in 1956. The holder of the mechanic's lien relied on the
above statute to support his claim that his lien was superior to the
prior recorded trust deed. The trust deed had no connection with
the remodeling except that it was aeainst the same real estate as
was the mechanic's lien. The court distinguished Darien v. Hudson
39
and Longton v. Husung,40 two earlier cases which have caused some
confusion in this area, by pointing out that both cases involved con-
struction loans placed upon the property for the purpose of financ-
ing the remodeling and repairing of existing structures, and that in
these cases the mechanic's liens grew out of the remodeling done
pursuant to these loans. In the principal case, since there was no
real connection between the trust deed and the mechanic's lien, the
prior recorded trust deed remains superior to the junior, later re-
corded, mechanic's lien. By this holding the court re-affirms the
interpretation of the statute given in Atkinson v. Colorado Title &
Trust Co.,41 wherein the court says:
'A6 356 P.2d 904 (Colo. 1960).
37 Another problem of proof brought to the court's attention in 1960 is worthy of brief mention.
In Arch A. Edwards Post No. 252, Reg. Vet. Assn. V. Gould, 356 P.2d 908 (Colo. 1960), an effort
was made to have the court construe a deed to be a mortgage. The court stated that the burden was
on the party desiring this construction to make a showing by clear and convincing evidence. Further,
the single fact that the property sold for $72,000 when the original offering price had been
$210,000 is not enough to sustain the burden of proof required. The court noted that such was suffi-
cient only to arouse some suspicion. Thus, while such a showing will not carry the burden of proof
required, it might assist in the showing when coupled with other more positive evidence.
.38 350 P.2d 197 (Colo. 1960).
39 134 Colo. 213, 302 P.2d 519 (1957).
40 91 Colo. 501, 16 P.2d 423 (1932).
41 59 Colo. 528, 151 Pac. 457 (1915).
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The phrase 'for an entire structure' is not used to designate
a completed from an uncompleted building, but to distin-
guish new structures, not before existing, from better-
ments, repairs, improvements, and the like on previously
constructed or existing improvements.
42
In Pull v. Barnes,43 the court's equitable powers were called
upon for relief when a house had been erected upon another's prop-
erty. "The evidence clearly discloses that neither party knew or
even suspected at the time of the construction of the cabin that it
was being built upon land belonging to defendants. '44 The court
noted the principle that a house built on land belongs to the owner
of the land, but they went on to say that such a situation furnishes
strong reason for a court of equity to interpose and grant relief.
They directed the trial court to inquire into the practicality and
feasibility of removing the improvements from the land, and if it be
determined practical and feasible, to specify the conditions
under which it be done. If the trial court determines that removal
is not feasible, then the value of the cabin is to be determined and
the land is to be subjected to an equitable lien in favor of the tres-
passer in an amount equal to the value of the cabin. The second
part of the court's directive to the trial court might, if used in some
later case, prove inequitable. It is not difficult to imagine a situa-
tion where a very expensive structure, but one which adds little or
no value to land or perhaps even detracts from the value of land, is
innocently erected on another's land. If it is not practical or feasible
to remove this structure, why should the owner of the land be sub-
jected to a lien against his land in an amount equal to the value of
the structure? A more equitable solution to such problems as pre-
sented in this case would be to give to the erector of the structure
a lien equal to the amount of the increase in the value of the land
upon which the structure was erected. If that were done, then an
expensive but useless structure, which did not increase the value of
the land, would not be allowed to detract from the value of the land
by creating a cloud on the title. If the land were materially bene-
fited by the structure, then the builder of the structure would have
a substantial lien against the property.
An interesting example of the inequities that can arise in face
of strict adherence to law was brought to the court's attention in
Handy v. Rogers.45 In this case the vendor of certain improved real
property sold the property and accepted a note secured by a mort-
gage on the property as a part of the purchase price. Default hav-
ing been made shortly thereafter, the vendor sued on the note and
recovered a judgment for its full amount. Then the trial court or-
dered sale of the mortgaged property to help satisfy the judgment.
Sale was had and the vendor purchased the property at the sale for
approximately one-fortieth of the amount of the judgment. Thus,
the vendor wound up with a judgment for the value of the land and
the land itself. The result so shocked the court's conscience that the
42 Id. at 537, 151 Pac. at 461.
43 350 P.2d 828 (Colo. 1960).
44 Id. at 829.
45 351 P.2d 819 (Colo. 1960).
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trial court was ordered to set aside the sale, to supervise any future
sale, and to refuse to confirm any sale producing a price having no
realistic relation to the actual value of the property. The court
quoted a United States Supreme Court opinion written by Mr. Jus-
tice Bradley, wherein he said:
It is insisted that the proceedings were all conducted ac-
cording to the forms of law. Very likely. Some of the
most atrocious frauds are committed in that way. Indeed,
the greater the fraud intended, the more particular the par-
ties to it often are to proceed according to the strictest
forms of law.
46
The case does not introduce any new or novel principle of law,
but it does illustrate the manner in which the court, using its equity
powers, can prevent the occasional sharp practice that adheres to
the letter, but not the spirit, of the law. A vigilant court can elim-
inate reams of curative legislation.
IX. ASSORTED FISH AND FOWL
In 1960 the Colorado Supreme Court re-affirmed its allegiance
to a position taken by a minority of other jurisdictions by holding
that an unqualified power of disposition of property devised to a life
tenant enlarges the life estate to a fee simple title. The case, In Re
Zell's Estate,47 is one of several Colorado cases to the same effect.4
Another doubtful area for title attorneys was clarified by the
court in Morley v. Gieseker49 concerning the question of whether a
title, quieted by decree against non-appearing defendants, who were
served by publication and who had yet six months within which
to appear and defend, was a merchantable title. The court held the
title not marketable and stated the general rule to be: "(A) quiet
title decree does not convert a defective title into a good or merch-
antable title until the judgment becomes impervious to attack."' 0
In Nelson v. Van Cleve,51 the court again -5 2 spells out the rule
governing the type of proof to be offered in causes in the nature of
quiet title actions or ejectment actions. It is this:
A person not in possession asserting title to real property
and seeking to enjoin others from claiming an interest
therein or possessing the same has the burden of furnish-
ing evidence which would enable the court to rest its de-
cision on the strength of his title, rather than on the sup-
posed weakness of the title of others claiming interests in
the property.'"
46 Graffam v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 180, 186 (1886).
47 351 P.2d 272 (Colo. 1960).
48 See Davey v. Weber, 133 Colo. 365, 295 P.2d 688 (1956).
49 351 P.2d 392 (Colo. 1960).
50 Id. at 393.
51 352 P.2d 269 (Colo. 1960).
52 For other cases involving the same principle see Goodrich v. Union Oil Co., 85 Colo. 218, 274
Pac. 935 (1929) and MacKay v. Silliman, 84 Colo. 220, 269 Pac. 901 (1928).
53 352 P.2d at 271. Mr. Chief Justice Sutton's concurring opinion lays bare what seems to be a
major flaw in the process by which the majority opinion reached its conclusion. Namely, in this case
the plaintiff was clearly in possession. By stipulation the parties had agreed that plaintiff had
installed concrete footings, I beams and a septic tank on the narrow strip of land in dispute. Chief
Justice Sutton comments-"f this isn't possession, what is it?" 352 P.2d at 273.
The majority opinion in this case was cited in a still later Colorado case, Colorado Corp. v. Huff,
355 P.2d 73 (Colo. 1960) where the court concluded that marking a cow pasture by placing surveyor's
red flags on it (along with other efforts at possession) did not constitute a diesseisin of the and.
This decision will come as a blow to law students who have been taught for years that the
disseisor must not only claim adversely but must "keep his flog flying." See Romans v. Nadler, 217
Minn. 174, 14 N.W.2d 482 (1944).
DICTA
MAY-JUNE, 1961
A new addition to the Colorado law of co-tenancy was made by
the court in Thomas v. Thomas. 5 4 The court announced the rule
that a co-tenant, improving jointly owned realty, will be allowed
the full amount by which the improvements enhanced the value of
the property, but not the cost of the improvements, or the amount
spent in making the improvements. The rationale behind allowing
recovery of the full amount is that the non-contributing co-tenant
should not be permitted to take advantage of improvements which
enrich the common property, but to which he has contributed noth-
ing.
Land conveyed to the City and County of Denver "for park
purposes" by quit claim deeds containing no defeasance clause or
provision for forfeiture, cannot be recovered by the grantor for
failure of the city to establish or maintain a park on the lands. In
so holding, in D. C. Burns Realty & Tr. Co. v. City & County of
Denver5 5 the court used again the principle laid down in the famous
Colorado case, Brown v. State,56 where an effort to reclaim the
ground upon which the state capitol now stands was similarly de-
nied.
Brice v. Pugh57 brought before the court a claim that the re-
cording of an oil and gas lease by a prospective lessee amounted to
an acceptance of the lease and a waiver of any objection to the title.
The court answered this claim by saying: "Recording alone is not,
as a matter of law, an acceptance of title nor does it necessarily
constitute 'exercising dominion over' a lease.
'58
Exactly what constitutes an acceptance has always been one of
the most troublesome problems facing the courts. When reading
this case, a large red lantern should be hung over the words "as a
matter of law" for most assuredly one of the best evidences of ac-
ceptance is the recording of an instrument. It should take more
than slight evidence to overcome a presumption of acceptance aris-
ing from such a recording.
Another interesting point contained in the Brice case involved
an oil and gas lease which was of record but which had terminated
automatically when the lessee failed to perform the conditions nec-
essary to extend the lease. The court held that when such a lease
terminated as between the parties for failure to pay delay rentals
or failure to drill the termination does not show of record auto-
matically, and therefore the lease constitutes a cloud on the title.
This being so, third parties, who must rely on the record to de-
termine the status of the title, may presume such lease to be in full
force and may use it as a valid objection to the title. Moral: Have
the lessee, holding under a lease with such a clause, execute a re-
lease upon the termination; then record the release so that the rec-
ords will reflect the true status of the title to the land. Needless to
say, this may be easier said than done in some cases.
54 352 P.2d 279 (Colo. 1960).
55 354 P.2d 150 (Colo. 1960).
565 Colo. 496 (1881).
57 354 P.2d 1024 (Colo. 1960).
58 Id. ct 1027.
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